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LENDING ON NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME
Anne M. Lee 
Old Dominion University, 2015 
Director: Dr. Ruth A. Triplett
This research aimed to bridge a gap in the literature between banks, mortgage 
investment, and neighborhood crime. Specifically, the current research uses the political 
economy approach to social disorganization theory (Bursik 1989) as a theoretical frame 
to understand the role of external investment on neighborhood levels of crime. This 
research was guided by several research questions that are derived from the prior 
literature on banks, mortgage lending and crime. The primary research question was: 
How do banks affect neighborhood levels o f crime? And secondly, how does residential 
lending affect crime?
These questions are investigated by combining several sources of available data. 
Crime data for 2012, 2008, and 2006 from Norfolk and Virginia Beach, Virginia were 
acquired from the respective police departments. The data consisted of crimes known to 
the police and the addresses of the general locations where the crimes occurred. The 
mortgage lending data was from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
website, which was established by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. The third source 
of data was gathered from the Polk City Directories, which had the addresses of the 
banks. Lastly, the 2000 Census was used to create several control variables such as
scales for residential instability and socioeconomic disadvantage that are included in the 
analyses.
Negative binominal regression, with the inclusion o f spatial lags for the crime and 
mortgage variables, was the method of analysis. Negative binominal regression is 
commonly used in criminological research when the dependent variable is a count rather 
than a rate. Spatial analysis was included because it has emerged as an important 
component of understanding neighborhood characteristics and levels of crime.
The findings indicated that banks and lending do have an effect on neighborhood 
levels of crime. It was theorized that banks, either having one in the neighborhood or one 
nearby, would have a positive effect on neighborhoods. However the results indicate that 
banks are associated with increases in violent crime and acts of vandalism. For 
residential lending the findings support prior research that increases in loan dollars to 
neighborhoods is associated with decreases in violent crime.
This dissertation is dedicated to those I have lost while on this journey; 
to Paul, to Mim and to Papa.
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1CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The investigation of a neighborhood’s role in crime has long been of interest to 
criminologists. Reiss suggested that examining the community is important at a very 
intuitive level because “our sense of personal safety and potential victimization by crime 
is shaped less by knowledge of specific criminals than it is by knowledge of dangerous 
and safe places and communities” (1986:1). Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social 
disorganization theory is an eminent theory that examines criminal behavior at the 
neighborhood level. Although this theory dominated criminology for decades, interest 
waned in the 1960s, but then was renewed in the 1980s. Developments in both areas of 
theory and research methodologies since then have substantially improved our ability to 
understand the effects of the neighborhood context on crime.
Though there have been several important developments in social disorganization 
theory, one of the most interesting is the impact of social institutions on neighborhoods. 
Social institutions have an important role in the neighborhood structure, stability, and 
resources. Sampson (2002) suggested that institutions that are viewed as legitimate and 
supported are necessary to community life and social control. Further, Triplett, Gainey, 
and Sun (2003) have suggested that social institutions, expressed by organizations, can 
play a part in managing behavior through their role in the provision of social control and 
support. Existing literature on the role of organizations within social disorganization 
theory has focused on a variety of organizations, most often alcohol outlets, and more 
recently schools and churches (Kautt and Roncek 2007; Lee and Bartkowski 2004;
Regnerus 2003; Roncek and Bell 1981; Roncek and LoBosco 1983; Triplett, White and 
Gainey 2013).
The role of depository banks (from here on referred to as banks) as an 
organization within the neighborhood is largely absent from the literature of social 
disorganization theory. Banks play an important role in the everyday lives of their 
customers and can potentially have an important impact on the neighborhoods within 
which they are located. Recent research conducted by Slocum, Rengifo, Choi, and 
Herrmann (2013) has found that the presence of institutions that link neighborhoods to 
outside resources are significantly associated with reduced levels of violent and property 
crimes in their area. Banks are one example of organizations that can bring outside 
resources into a neighborhood. A bank can infuse outside resources into a neighborhood 
through residential lending, such as home mortgage loans, refinancing, and home 
improvement loans. Recently, Velez and colleagues (see Velez 2009; Velez, Lyons, and 
Boursaw 2012; Velez and Richardson 2012) have used the political economy approach of 
social disorganization theory to examine the relationship between residential lending and 
neighborhood crime. Velez and colleagues conceptualized residential lending as a form 
of external investment into neighborhoods.
Today, home loans such as mortgages, refinancing, and home improvement loans 
do not all originate from depository banks as they once did. An aspect that is unique to 
the United States mortgage market is the sizeable presence of a secondary market. Coles 
and Hardt (2000) suggested that roughly half of all U.S. residential mortgages are 
approved by mortgage bankers, who have little to no funds to grant loans themselves.
3They then sell the mortgages to the secondary market for profit. In addition, mortgage 
brokers and online vendors offer financing opportunities for home purchases.
Although over half of US mortgages originate from mortgage banks, banks hold a 
vital role in the acquisition of home loans. In the process of applying for home loans, 
numerous sources of information are needed for loan qualification and approval. Rose’s 
(2011) research in Virginia has suggested that credit scores, household income and 
expenses, and outstanding debts are among the most requested loan approval materials. 
Personal assets such as statements for checking and savings accounts, investments, and 
the value of life insurance policies and other valuable possessions, however, are also 
often requested (Mortgage Bankers Association 2013).
In addition to simply having a bank account, researchers suggest two other ways 
in which banks are important to loan acquisition asset accumulation and the accumulation 
of soft information. In one study of banking and asset accumulation, Camey and Gale 
(2001) found that nearly 20 percent of US households were without bank accounts. 
Further, the authors found that not having a checking account was negatively and 
significantly related to asset accumulation such as home and vehicle ownership. Ergungor 
(2010) has found that having a bank branch near low to moderate-income neighborhoods 
was positively related to mortgage origination. Further, these positive effects were 
stronger for bank branches that are closer to these neighborhoods. Ergungor (2010) has 
suggested that the accumulation of “soft information” on potential borrowers offers 
useful information for lenders. Soft information includes factors that are not included in 
credit and risk scoring, such as spending habits, overdraft occurrences, and bill payment 
history.
4Although residential lending is seen as an infusion of financial resources from 
outside of the neighborhood, the impact can differ, depending on the type of lending. 
Immergluck and Smith (2004) found that, in Chicago between the late 1990s and 2002, 
subprime loans resulted in foreclosures 20 times more often than prime mortgage loans 
did. Other research has found that neighborhoods that have high rates of subprime- 
mortgage foreclosure also have increased public order crimes, larcenies, burglaries, drug 
violations, and incidents of disorderly conduct (Teasedale, Clark, and Hinkle 2012). 
Alternatively, research on the prime lending market has found that the infusion of 
resources into neighborhoods in the form of home loans results in significant reductions 
in crime (Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Velez 2009; Velez 
et al. 2012; Velez and Richardson 2012).
The current research drew on the political economy approach to test social 
disorganization theory and examined the role of neighborhood institutions, specifically 
banks, on crime. In light of the findings discussed above, it was theorized that the 
presence of banks would be beneficial to the neighborhoods in which they are located and 
nearby, and that this will work through residential lending. This is an important 
contribution to the literature because banks are organizations that have rarely been 
included in previous research. Banks have been included as secondary independent 
variables (Small and McDermott 2006) and as intervening variables in analyses between 
payday lenders and crime (Kubrin, Squires, Graves, and Ousey 2011); however, banks 
have not been the focus of any analyses relating to crime. Existing research that has 
examined the impact of residential lending has focused mainly on homicide and other 
violent crimes, and less on property crime.
A further shortcoming of the existing literature is the way that mortgage lending 
has been defined and measured. Previous literature has only looked at mortgages or the 
three forms of investment combined (Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; Squires and 
Kubrin 2006; Velez 2009; Velez et al. 2012; Velez and Richardson 2012), so the 
separation of forms of investment could be a substantial contribution to the field. These 
are two limitations that are overcome in this research, which include crimes of vandalism 
and separates the different forms of residential lending.
This research will be guided by several research questions that are derived from 
the prior literature on banks, residential lending, and crime. The primary research 
question is: How do banks affect neighborhood levels of crime? This question has only 
briefly been covered in financial and criminological literature (see Fairchild and Rai 
2011; Garmaise and Moskowitz 2004). Several additional questions are included that are 
intended to further the understanding of the relationship between banks and crime. One 
question that has not been addressed in the previous literature is what effect locally 
operated banks have on neighborhood levels of crime? Another question guiding the 
research aims to bridge a gap in the literature of the role of banks in residential lending. 
That is, how does having a bank in or nearby a neighborhood impact levels of residential 
lending? Further, do locally owned banks affect neighborhood residential lending 
investment differently than banks owned not locally?
The third question brings the previous questions to the main concern of 
neighborhood crime, asking how do banking investments affect neighborhood crime? A 
further question will address another gap in the literature by asking if different forms of
banking investment, such as mortgages, refinancing, and home improvement loans, have 
different effects on neighborhood crime?
These questions will be investigated by combining several sources of available 
data. Crime data from Norfolk and Virginia Beach, Virginia, were acquired from the 
respective police departments. The data consisted of crimes known to the police and the 
block locations where the crime occurred. The crime data were categorized into three 
types of crime for analysis: violent crime, property crime, and acts of vandalism. The 
residential lending data were from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
website, which was established by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. Data on 
mortgage lending, refinancing, and home improvement loans for each census tract 
included in Norfolk and Virginia Beach were collected from this source. The third 
source of data was the Polk City Directories for the cities of Norfolk and Virginia Beach 
in 2011, 2009 and 2007. They were used to collect the addresses of the banks. Lastly, 
the 2000 U.S. census was used to create several control variables that were included in 
the analyses.
The methods that were used to examine the data were negative binominal 
regressions, with the inclusion of spatial lags. Negative binominal regression is 
commonly used in criminological research when the dependent variable is a count rather 
than a rate. Poisson-based regression models such as negative binominal regression are 
better suited for counts of events because “they are built on assumptions about error 
distributions that are consistent with the nature of event counts” (Osgood 2000:21). 
Additionally, spatial analysis has emerged as an important component of understanding 
neighborhood characteristics and levels of crime. Heitgerd and Bursik (1987) were some
7of the first to investigate spatial influence on neighborhood levels of delinquency, finding 
that neighborhood delinquency was influenced by the delinquency of the neighborhoods 
that surround it. Years later, Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush (2001) increased the 
popularity of the investigation into spatial analysis by expanding on the methodologies 
that can examine spatial effects.
The next chapter discusses the theoretical perspective that was used to understand 
the influence of banks and residential lending on crime. An historical overview of the 
creation and development of social disorganization theory is provided, including the 
addition of the political economy perspective and the more recent expansion of the role 
that social institutions can play in neighborhoods. The second chapter concludes with 
theoretical reasoning of how banking is related to residential lending and, more 
importantly, crime.
The third chapter reviews the empirical literature on social institutions, banks, 
residential lending, and crime. The empirical literature starts with the impact of two 
important institutions, education and religion, as expressed by schools and churches, and 
their impact on neighborhood crime. The primary focus of the review of the empirical 
literature is on the role o f financial institutions, the importance of homeownership and the 
effect of residential lending on neighborhood crime. The chapter concludes with an 
introduction of the hypotheses that are tested. The fourth chapter covers the data, 
variables, and methods that will be used to conduct this research. Lastly, an overview of 
the use and importance of spatial analysis in community research, and negative binomial 
regression in crime research is given. The fifth chapter describes the data used and the
results of the hypotheses testing. The final chapter summarizes the findings and 
discusses the implications, limitations and directions for future research.
9CHAPTER II
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS
A neighborhood is greater than the sum of its parts. A neighborhood is an 
evolving and changing entity, with numerous components that work together in its 
functioning. Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory embodies this idea. 
Despite a decline in interest between 1960-1980, social disorganization theory has been 
influential in the field of criminology since its inception. Shaw and McKay’s (1942) 
social disorganization theory was developed from the concepts of urban and human 
ecology and the work of the Chicago School. The development of social disorganization 
theory was arguably influenced by the change in urbanization that sociologists at the 
University of Chicago were witnessing (see Park and Burgess 1925; Thomas and 
Znaniecki 1918-1920). The development of the theory and its revitalization has been 
closely associated with the social contexts in which they were positioned. In this chapter 
the origins of social disorganization theory are discussed, and the critiques of this theory 
are covered. Further, overviews of important theoretical advances that have occurred 
since its development are provided, including the role of institutions. Lastly, the political 
economy approach of social disorganization theory is introduced.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY
The first years of the 20th century saw many changes in the ways of life for people 
in the United States. The U.S. entered into the First World War in 1917, creating a 
demand for laborers as white males were assembled for the war effort (Massey 2007). In 
order to meet the demand, women, minorities, and non-white immigrants were allowed to
10
enter the labor force. This was a substantial development for women, who to this point 
were not a major part of the industrial work force. In addition, it caused a considerable 
migration of African Americans from rural to urban industrial areas (Pfohl 1994).
Further, advances in the technology available to industry and agriculture created a need 
for a more substantial managerial class.
With the end of the First World War, soldiers returned home creating another 
economic shift. This shift resulted in the unemployment of those who had migrated to 
sustain the economy in the soldier’s absence. Most of the workers who had migrated 
lived in urban areas near one another, resulting in declining living conditions and slums 
that were physically close but socially distant from more advantaged areas (Pfohl 1994).
At the beginning of the 20th century then, cities were greatly expanded by 
population growth and migration. The growth they experienced was rapid, and citizens 
often fell victim to crimes and other problems that had not been of concern in small, 
communal, rural living. Chicago was one of the many cities that experienced this 
unprecedented growth, and it was in this context that social disorganization theory was 
created.
Thomas and Znaniecki (1918-1920) were the first sociologists at the University of 
Chicago to coin the term social disorganization, which they defined as the diminished 
impact of prevailing social rules on individuals. Social disorganization is the term that 
they applied to their content analysis of personal documents from Polish immigrants who 
were struggling and confused by the rapid change in growing U.S. industrial cities. In 
their content analysis the theme that became evident was that the rules and norms that 
governed behavior before no longer applied in their new situation. According to Pfohl
11
(1994), it is important to note that in this conception, social disorganization was not 
attempting to explain criminal behavior, but instead to understand the social experience 
of the recent immigrants. Thomas and Znaniecki’s conceptualization of social 
disorganization was the start of the long history of the theory.
University o f Chicago sociologist Park applied the concept of social 
disorganization to an ecological model to the city. Borrowing terms from plant ecology, 
the model was used for analysis of the urban development of Chicago, examining the 
relationships between people and where they lived (Park 1925). A central theme of this 
work was that large cities develop and expand in similar ways in their physical, social 
and cultural aspects (Morris 1958). In the field of plant ecology it was believed there was 
an interdependent relationship between different plants and living organisms located near 
each other, and that the invasion of other species could offset the balance. In ecology it 
was thought that if a new species invaded the area, there would be competition, followed 
by efforts by the existing species to exert dominance, concluding with a new form of 
interdependent symbiosis (Pfohl 1994). Park and Burgess (1925) applied this process of 
invasion to urban development, but instead of a new species, it was technology, 
immigration, and urbanization that were invading the existing symbiotic relationships of 
the city.
Burgess (1925) postulated the growth of cities occurred in concentric circles from 
the center o f the city outward, as expansion was needed. In Burgess’ (1925) model o f the 
city, the center of the city, zone I, contains the businesses and industry, and the area out­
side of that, zone II, is constantly experiencing transition between housing and the 
infiltration of business. This area is referred to as the zone of transition, and this constant
12
influx of business and industry results in undesirable living conditions. This zone often 
contains the slum areas of the city, and depending on the industries in the area unpleasant 
conditions may be present, such as noise, odors, and dirt. The area outside of the zone of 
transition is zone III, then IV, and V; the conditions become more desirable as one 
continues to move away from the center of the city. The third zone is typically home to 
members of the working class, zone IV to residential homes for those who are more 
economically secure, and zone V contains those who have the ability to commute to work 
from the suburbs (Shaw and McKay 1942).
Shaw and McKay (1942) observed that during the period of growth in Chicago 
many other neighborhood characteristics were associated with population changes in 
neighborhoods. For example, neighborhoods that had a large proportion of families who 
received public assistance were also areas where the population had recently decreased. 
Also, these neighborhoods had a high level of physical deterioration to the buildings and 
housing, as seen in the zone of transition. Further investigation of the zone of transition 
found that it was characterized by a lower economic status, high rates of population 
mobility, and high levels of population heterogeneity. The reverse was also found. In 
neighborhoods that had a low percent of families who received public assistance, the 
population had recently increased, and there was little physical deterioration, as seen on 
the fringes of large cities.
Shaw and McKay (1942) applied the concept of concentric zones of the city to the 
understanding of crime and delinquent behavior. The data they used to examine this 
relationship included juveniles who had been brought to the court, committed to juvenile 
detention, and who had worked with police probation offices. The extensive data
collected covered the time span of 33 years. Shaw and McKay (1942) mapped the 
addresses of each of juvenile, by hand, on large maps of Chicago. A central finding from 
the mapping of juvenile arrests was that delinquency was highest in the inner areas of the 
city. Specifically, zone II had the highest rate of delinquents, though they were generally 
arrested in zone I. In addition, rates of delinquency decreased the farther away from the 
center of the city one moved. Finally, Shaw and McKay (1942) found that delinquency 
rates remained stable over time and through changes in population.
Focusing their attention on the zone of transition, Shaw and McKay (1942) found 
it to be distinctive in various ways. First was the high rate o f poverty. Due to the zone in 
transition’s undesirable setting, the constant invasion of business and industry, and poorly 
maintained buildings and structures, only the poorest of the poor lived there. Those who 
were financially able to move out of this area did so, resulting in high levels of social 
mobility. All of the rapid change that resulted was the second distinctive characteristic of 
the zone in transition. People were constantly moving in and out of the area, so there was 
little residential stability. Everyone was trying to get out of the area, viewing their stay as 
temporary (Shaw and McKay 1942). Population heterogeneity was the third distinctive 
characteristic of the zone in transition. Those who were the poorest were also usually of 
a minority status, creating a situation where there was a large population of different 
minorities in disadvantaged neighborhoods. These three community characteristics 
resulted in what Shaw and McKay (1942) viewed as neighborhoods that were socially 
disorganized. However, as will be discussed below, Shaw and McKay never defined the 
term “social disorganization” in their original work.
Shaw and McKay’s theory of social disorganization experienced wide acceptance 
until the 1960s, when three changes occurred. First, new explanations of criminal 
behavior were emerging. New theoretical developments shifted the focus back to the 
micro level of analysis, and soon social disorganization theory was viewed as trivial to 
criminology (Bursik 1988; Cullen and Agnew 2011). Second, the social context had 
changed. The concerns of immigration, urbanization, and industrialization that led to the 
creation of the theory were no longer in the spotlight. Finally, important critiques of the 
theory had emerged. These critiques promoted the theory’s wane in popularity but also 
pointed to areas where there was a need for further theoretical development.
CRITIQUES OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION THEORY
Despite its popularity, social disorganization theory received substantial criticism, 
leading many to dismiss the theory and even question if  it should have been considered a 
theory in the first place. For example, Davidson (1981:85) suggested social 
disorganization “should been seen as a descriptive convenience rather than a model of 
criminogenic behavior.” While there are a number of criticisms, four are critical to 
understanding the developments that more recent theorists have contributed.
First, one of the principle criticisms of social disorganization theory was that 
Shaw and McKay proposed a mixed model (Komhauser 1978). Their early 
conceptualization of the theory suggested that disorganization contributed to weak social 
controls, which in turn allowed for delinquent subcultures to develop and facilitate 
criminal activity (Komhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1942). Komhauser (1978) argued 
that social disorganization theory could be a pure control model and should remove the 
inclusion of delinquent subcultures as she viewed it as a weakness of the theory. The
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inclusion of subcultures resulted in a related critique she made, which was that the theory 
ignored other relationships in the social organization of the slum. Komhauser (1978) 
argued that social disorganization theory could be strengthened if the theorists had 
expanded their scope of interest to include the relationships between family and the 
community structural context as well.
A second substantial criticism made by several critics (Bursik 1988; Komhauser 
1978) is a lack of definition for “social disorganization.” Indeed, Shaw and McKay 
(1942) never formally defined social disorganization; the meaning of this term was only 
implied. The lack of definition has resulted in confusion over their use o f the term. It has 
been pointed out that at times it is difficult to separate the causes of social disorganization 
from the effects of social disorganization (Bursik 1988). Others have argued that since 
the cause and effects were so interrelated the lack of definition created a tautology 
(Komhauser 1978; Bursik 1988). This confusion led to research that further exacerbated 
the misunderstanding, such as research conducted by Lander (1954) who defined 
delinquency as social disorganization. Further, as Sampson and Groves (1989) pointed 
out, no one had directly tested the intervening variables between community structure 
and crime.
A third area of criticism was the assumption of consensus that is implied in the 
conceptualization of social disorganization theory. Bursik (1988) pointed out that if 
social disorganization is defined as the inability of a community to achieve agreed upon 
goals, there is an assumption that all of the residents of the community agree on the goals. 
This is problematic because this assumption has never been tested, and there is little
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consensus on less serious offenses. Burisk (1988) argued however that serious crime is a 
condition with which no one wants to live.
A further normative assumption implicit in the social disorganization model is the 
notion of a “natural” housing market. Bursik (1988) argued that Shaw and McKay never 
acknowledged that neighborhoods and citizens could be influenced by mechanisms other 
than the housing market, which research has suggested is not a natural process (Skogan 
1986; Suttles 1972). Additional research by Skogan (1986) has found several 
mechanisms outside of the community that can impact neighborhoods, including 
“disinvestment, demolition and construction, demagoguery, and deindustrialization” 
(206-207).
Beyond these concerns of conceptualizations and assumptions, Bursik (1988) 
noted that social disorganization theory has received criticisms on methodological 
grounds as well. For example, Shaw and Mckay’s (1942) original work and subsequent 
tests of social disorganization theory have relied solely on official records of delinquent 
and criminal acts (Bursik 1988). Reliance on official records is problematic because of 
the potential for systematic bias, and the exclusion of unreported or undocumented 
crimes. Further, the use of cross-sectional data encumbers understanding of the changing 
nature of the community that is intrinsic to the theory. Bursik wrote:
Since it is impossible to study change in such a design, cross-sectional studies 
must assume that local communities are not undergoing a redefinition of their role 
in the ecological system, i.e., the spatial distribution of crime and delinquency 
rates is relatively stable (1988:524).
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The assumption of stability is contradictory to the theory. The assumption of change 
makes tests of the theory complicated and easier said than done.
In the period since these critiques, social disorganization theory underwent 
substantial reworking. The revisions of the theory sought to address many of the key 
critiques.
REVITALIZATION AND RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL 
DISORGANIZATION
Despite dismissal by much of the criminological community by the 1960s, a few 
researchers continued to utilize social disorganization theory. According to Cullen and 
Agnew (2011), the revitalization of social disorganization theory came in the 1980s, 
when characteristics of the community were “discovered” once again as important in 
understanding criminal behavior. A number of works were instrumental in the 
revitalization of the theory. Research by Blau and Blau (1982) in the early 1980s 
highlighted findings that rates of violence were higher in urban areas that suffered from 
social inequality, demonstrating the significant impact that macro-level analysis can have. 
Several years later, Sampson (1986) conducted research on the effects of formal and 
informal social control, using a macro-level of analysis. From his analysis of almost 200 
large cities in 1980, he concluded that communities differed in their ability to exert 
informal social control, further supporting the renewal of social disorganization 
(Sampson 1986).
Three years later, perhaps the most significant work in the development o f social 
disorganization theory was published by Sampson and Groves (1989). It refined Shaw 
and McKay’s (1942) theory, and offered solutions to many of the theory’s shortcomings.
Sampson and Groves (1989) employed the approach of the systemic model advanced by 
Kasarda and Janowitz (1974; Janowitz 1951) to develop the theory. According to 
Kasarda and Janowitz (1974), the systemic model asserts that the community is a 
complex web of friendships and kinships, as well as formal and informal associations that 
are part of family and social life. From the systemic model the causes and effects of 
social disorganization were clarified. In addition, one of the most important contributions 
Sampson and Groves (1989) made was the development of a way to directly test the 
theory. To measure levels of community disorganization, they examined informal local 
friendships, the community’s ability to supervise and control teenage groups, and levels 
o f participation in formal or voluntary local organizations.
Using data from the British Crime Survey, Sampson and Groves (1989) found 
significant support for Shaw and McKay’s original theory. Several independent variables 
were found to be associated with the key components of community disorganization. The 
variable of residential stability was found to be positively and significantly associated 
with local friendship networks. An increase in the independent variable of social 
economic status increased participation in community organizations, and decreased the 
presence of unsupervised groups of teens. Further, they found that in communities where 
there was a lack of local friendship networks, low participation in community 
organizations, and the presence of unsupervised teenagers, there were also significantly 
higher rates of crime and delinquency. In their findings, they briefly suggested that in 
high crime areas, resident fear of crime might inhibit local friendships and community 
organization participation. They proposed that since people are afraid of crime, that they 
may additionally be afraid to venture outside of their home and socialize with members
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of the community. This vital piece in social disorganization literature reconceptualized 
the theory and clarified both the definition and measurement of social disorganization. It 
led to a renewed interest in developing and testing social disorganization theory.
Theorists Bursik and Grasmick (1993) further reconceptualized and redefined 
aspects of social disorganization theory. Bursik and Grasmick enhanced the definitions 
of essential components of the theory, such as neighborhoods, social control, and crime.
In their work, neighborhoods were conceptualized as having three definitive aspects: 
location, a collective social life, and a tradition of identity and stability over time. This 
definition of a neighborhood moved beyond the use of the government-designated census 
tract data that social disorganization theory has been criticized for using, and began to 
unearth the difficulty of defining a community (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Bursik and 
Grasmik (1993) then defined social control as “the effort of the community to regulate 
itself and the behavior o f residents and visitors to the neighborhood to achieve this 
specific goal” (15) of living in a relatively crime free area. Finally in their discussion of 
crime, they focused on crimes that are considered mala in se, such as rape and murder.
By focusing on mala in se crimes, they resolved earlier concerns of assumed consensus.
Perhaps most importantly, Bursik and Grasmick (1993) also included an explicit 
recognition of the levels of social order developed by Hunter (1985) in their model of 
neighborhood crime. According to Hunter, there are three levels of social order and 
control: private, parochial and public, present in the community. Hunter (1985) 
postulated that the most intimate social bond is the private level, which consists of close 
personal ties of friendship and family connections. These relationships are rarely 
confined to spatial closeness, often overlapping into the other levels of social order and
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control. The second level is the parochial, which consists of less intimate and personal 
friendships, acquaintances, and neighbor relationships. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) 
suggested that control at this level reveals a community’s ability to supervise the 
behaviors of other members in the neighborhood.
Finally, Hunter (1985) acknowledged the public level of social order and control. 
It is the least intimate social order and is predominately manifested in formal agencies. 
Hunter (1985) suggested that the public level of control is present in the interaction of 
strangers, but can permeate private and parochial levels as well. Bursik and Grasmick 
proposed that the public level of social control can refer to a community’s ability to 
“influence political and economic decision making” (1993:17) and attain goods and 
services located outside of the neighborhood to assist in crime control efforts. The 
addition of the public level is particularly important because, until this point, it had been 
largely ignored in the social disorganization literature.
There have been several other significant developments in social disorganization 
theory (see Coleman 1988; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Warner and Rountree 
1997) but one in particular is of interest for the current research. In the next section the 
increasing attention to the role of institutions and neighborhood-based organization is 
discussed.
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL 
DISORGANIZATION THEORY
Prior theory and research on social disorganization theory has focused largely on 
social ties within the community. However, more recently research in the area of social 
disorganization theory has been framed around the role of institutions, how they shape
communities, and their effects on crime rates. In his 2010 presidential address to the 
American Society of Criminology, Rosenfeld called for a shift in the field to focus on 
“the big picture,” or back to macrocriminology. One of the focal points of Rosenfeld’s 
argument was his focus on the importance of social institutions as a key variable in 
macrosocial analysis. Citing the classic work of Talcott Parsons, Rosenfeld suggested 
that for societies to exist over time they need to meet four criteria: “1) adapt to the 
physical environment, 2) mobilize resources to achieve collective goals, 3) integrate the 
subparts of the society around common values and 4) maintain members’ allegiance to 
the basic normative patterns” (2011:11). Social institutions operate to achieve these 
goals and sustain society. Rosenfeld (2011) suggested that no institution, be it the 
economy, political system, or educational system, functions in a vacuum, but rather that 
they are interdependent in nature. In fact, institutions rely upon one another in order to 
function properly. Rosenfeld further argued that investigation of institutions will display 
how organizations, which are manifestations of social institutions, should work, while the 
examination of these organizations display how institutions operate in reality (2011:12).
The importance of institutions in community research is not a new development, 
but rather a new focus in criminological research. For example, Shaw and McKay 
viewed the failure of institutions, such as education and family, to fulfill the needs of 
impoverished residents as the ultimate failure of a community (Komhauser 1978). In 
addition, community researchers often included the role of institutions in definitions of 
human ecology in the late 1950s. McKenzie (1942), as cited by Morris (1958), stated: 
Knowledge of ecological processes... is basic to all social sciences, as social and 
political institutions have a spatial base, and arise and function in response to
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changing conditions of environment and competition. Institutional stability is 
largely dependent on the stability o f space relations (1958:6).
Although institutions have often been considered an important component of 
understanding human behavior and neighborhoods, they have not been the focus of study.
Recent criminological research has argued that institutions within a neighborhood 
that are viewed as legitimate and government supported are essential to community life 
(Sampson 2002). Triplett et al. (2003) suggested that institutions, such as the family and 
the economy, are able to manage behavior in the course of their functioning because of 
their provision of social control and support. They further contend that institutions vary 
in their control of and influence on the community, based on their strength. Combining 
the investigative perspective of Rosenfeld (2011), with the ideas of Triplett et al. (2003), 
a strong social institution is demonstrated through organizations that are stable, have 
ample resources, clear understandings of roles and expected behavior, and are connected 
with other organizations and institutions. Conversely, weak institutions can be identified 
by organizations that are unstable, lack connections with other institutions, and have 
limited resources. Often weak institutions are in neighborhoods that have a high 
percentage of poor residents, high mobility rates, and are racially and ethnically 
heterogeneous. Further, not only do such neighborhoods have difficulty maintaining 
existing institutions, but they also struggle in attracting and establishing new 
organizations to improve institution strength (Triplett et al. 2003).
Triplett et al. (2003) suggested several reasons why organizations, specifically 
strong ones, are imperative to neighborhoods and communities. First, they can be 
important for the role that they play in fostering social ties and networks within
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neighborhoods, as they often connect community neighbors. Further organizations can 
bring resources into a neighborhood, such as social capital and social support, which are 
vital in the punishment of deviant behavior within a community. Second, social 
institutions fill a role through organizations in the process of informal social control, 
which can be reduced in weak and disorganized neighborhoods (Triplett et al. 2003). 
Lastly, organizations can assist in the development of social and human capital for the 
residents of the neighborhood.
Relating to the earlier discussion of Hunter’s (1985) levels of social order, 
institutions are involved at all three levels. For example, the institution of family 
operates most commonly at the private level, while religion, which may be expressed by 
the institution of churches or other groups, can simultaneously occupy the parochial, 
private, and public levels. However, not all organizations have the capacity for the more 
intimate levels of social control, and most operate primarily at the public level of social 
control.
Organizations can have a substantial influence on the neighborhoods in which 
they are located. Most discussions of organizations assume that they have an interest in 
the well being of the neighborhood, but this assumption could be mistaken.
Organizations can have damaging effects as well. As suggested in the original 
conceptualization of social disorganization, people and neighborhoods are not always 
capable of or responsible for designating who and what becomes part of their community. 
This is especially true when considering the influence of organizations from outside of 
the neighborhoods. In order to allow for further understanding of the power institutions 
have in neighborhoods, the theory needs to expand to account for influences and
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decisions made outside of the community. To alleviate this problem, Bursik (1989) 
suggested the integration of a conflict perspective in the analysis of neighborhood crime, 
often referred to as the political economy perspective.
CONFLICT AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION 
The traditional conceptualization of social disorganization theory follows a 
consensus model. The consensus model of society and law posits that members of a 
society come together to create the norms and rules o f a society in order to benefit the 
greater good. This model argues that there is a shared belief in what is considered right 
and wrong, good and evil, what is important, and what is acceptable in a society for the 
majority of issues and concerns (Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould 2010). The assumption of 
consensus is highlighted in the definition of social disorganization as a characteristic of a 
community that is “unable to realize its values.” This implies that all members in the 
community hold or agree on similar values.
Conversely, the conflict view does not believe that society is organized to benefit 
the greater good, but for the benefit of the rich, wealthy, and powerful. The conflict 
model holds that values are determined by interest, and that what is considered right and 
wrong is conceived in the view of personal gains and losses (Bernard et al. 2010). Law 
and society created under this model benefits those who hold enough power to control the 
government and state, by allowing them to pursue their self-interest without interruption 
by the state (Bernard et al. 2010).
Bursik (1989) suggested the need for integration of a conflict model to account 
for decisions that impact neighborhoods, but are made outside of its confines by non­
members. He argued that, as classically conceptualized, the neighborhood is a ‘natural
25
area’, which developed from invasion and succession, and open market housing. Bursik 
(1989) then suggested that this may have been accurate in the context in which the 
original work was created but that after the conclusion of WWII neighborhoods and 
communities have largely been intentionally planned. The allocation of land, incentives 
to builders, zoning, and the growth of bureaucracies have all played a role in the 
decreased power of neighborhoods to defend their interests.
In a test of this idea, Bursik (1989) used neighborhoods across Chicago in order to 
examine changes in delinquency in areas that had recently built public housing. Bursik 
(1989) found that the neighborhood’s ability to resist is what determined in which 
neighborhoods new public housing was built in, not open market characteristics. Further, 
the development of public housing resulted in increases in instability, which has 
traditionally been associated with higher rates of social disorganization and therefore 
delinquency. Bursik argued this was evidence that “political dynamics can directly affect 
the level of social disorganization in a community, thereby indirectly affecting the level 
of delinquency” (1989:117).
This development created new interest in the social disorganization theory, and is 
crucial to the understanding of the role that organizations-especially those outside the 
neighborhood-can play in neighborhood dynamics and crime rates. Bearing in mind that 
not all elements of a neighborhood are determined by residents, careful consideration 
should be paid to all components o f the neighborhood. One organization that has the 
potential to influence neighborhoods from outside of their boundaries and has been 
missing from the literature on the role o f institutions in neighborhoods is banks.
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THEORETICAL IMPORTANCE OF BANKS IN NEIGHBORHOODS
Social disorganization has recently expanded its theoretical scope to include 
social institutions and the organizations that express them to see how they affect the 
neighborhoods they are in and are nearby. Banks and other financial institutions are 
largely absent from the social disorganization literature. However, banks and other 
financial institutions should be included in the literature because they play an important 
role in society and the everyday lives of their customers. Further, because of the gap in 
the literature, it is unknown if banks have positive or negative effects on neighborhoods.
There are two lines of thinking and research relating the importance of banking to 
the neighborhood context. First is that banking has been found to be associated with 
asset accumulation, specifically homeownership (Carney and Gale 2000; Fellowes and 
Mabanta 2008). Less than 3 percent o f unbanked households in the United States own 
their home, highlighting the vital relationship between being banked and homeownership. 
Social disorganization theory has long related homeownership with residential stability 
and thus to lower levels of neighborhood crime.
Second, research has connected the presence of bank branches in neighborhoods 
to access to loans and mortgage lending (Ergungor 2010; Ergungor and Moulton 2011) 
because of asset accumulation and the collection of “soft information.” Further, the 
Community Reinvestment Act that was implemented in 1977 requires banks that have 
branches in low to moderate-income areas to meet the credit needs of the nearby 
community (Squires and Kubrin 2006). Ergungor (2010) has suggested that from this 
regulation it would be expected that neighborhoods that contain banks would have higher 
levels of residential lending.
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Additionally, Velez (2009) identified three ways in which bank residential loans 
for home improvement, re-financing, mortgages etc., can improve neighborhoods in ways 
that prevent or reduce crime. First, investment from financial institutions can reduce 
signs of physical disorder that are present in the neighborhood. Second, investment has 
the potential to increase the access to resources outside of the neighborhood, such as 
external investments. The third way Velez suggested that investment can be beneficial to 
neighborhoods is by enhancing the appeal to local businesses and thus creating 
employment. She stated that, “Neighborhoods that receive few bank loans are unable to 
build new housing, repair dilapidated housing, recruit new home buyers, sustain existing 
businesses, or attract new businesses” (2009:155). The conditions listed by Velez can be 
prevented and amended by financial resources, and are vital for neighborhood conditions 
that deter crime.
The inclusion of social institutions into social disorganization theory is an 
important theoretical development. Theoretically there are reasons that banks should be 
examined in the neighborhood context; however, they have rarely been included in prior 
research. The empirical literature on the role of institutions has focused on alcohol 
outlets, schools and churches in neighborhoods, which is where we start the next chapter. 
Testing of the theoretical connections between banking and neighborhoods are then 
covered. Additionally, the existing literature on homeownership, residential lending, and 
crime is covered. The last component o f the third chapter is the hypotheses that are 
drawn from the theoretical perspective and empirical literature.
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CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND CRIME
Social institutions and organizations have long been incorporated as important 
mechanisms of neighborhood social control in the social disorganization literature. Yet, 
as Triplett and colleagues (2003) have stressed, this link has not received much attention 
in the empirical literature. Theoretically, it is hypothesized that institutions can reduce 
levels of neighborhood crime by promoting prosocial attitudes and behaviors, and by 
augmenting private, parochial, and public levels o f control (Bursik & Grasmick 1993; 
Hunter 1985; Slocum et al. 2013; Wilson 1996). Further, research by Small (2006) 
suggested that some institutions also possess a role as resource broker in lower income 
areas. According to this line of thinking organizations have ties to other organizations 
and connect their clients with resources available from other organizations. Schools, 
churches, and alcohol outlets are organizations that have received attention in the 
literature, but recently the kinds of community organizations examined has been 
expanding.
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON INSTITUTIONS
Schools, second only to families, are one of the most important institutions for the 
socialization of children. This is only one of the many reasons that schools have 
traditionally been viewed in a positive light; however, research in recent decades on the 
effect schools have on the neighborhoods they are located within has presented a new 
perspective. In the early 1980s, researcher Dennis Roncek and several colleagues started
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to investigate the effects of schools on neighborhood levels of crime. In their initial 
work, Roncek and LoBosco (1983) found that in San Diego’s residential areas that 
contained a public high school, there were higher rates of crime than those that were not 
adjacent to a school. Two years later, Roncek and Faggiani (1985) replicated the study in 
a different city to see if the San Diego findings had generalizability. Conducting the 
replication in Cleveland, Ohio, similar findings were reached. Neighborhoods that were 
within a city block of a public high school were victim to higher rates of crime.
More recent research has continued to find a consistent relationship between high 
schools and higher levels of neighborhood crime (see Astor, Benbenishty, and Meyer 
2004; Gouvis-Roman 2004; Murray and Swatt 2013; Willits, Broidy, and Denman 2013). 
Recently, however, attention has begun to expand the empirical literature to include 
middle and elementary schools. Kautt and Roncek (2007) focused on burglaries in 
Cleveland in the years 1989-1991. Their findings were inconsistent with previous 
research. Specifically, they did not find a significant relationship between high schools 
and higher levels of crime. However, they did discover a relationship between 
elementary schools and increased probabilities of burglaries, and they found that higher 
enrollment was significantly related to the probability of burglary.
Several years later, with the new interest in spatial analysis, these relationships 
were tested again. Murray and Swatt (2013) examined the effect of public and private 
high, middle, and elementary schools located within or adjacent to residential areas and 
the crimes of residential burglary, motor vehicle theft, and felony assault. Murray and 
Swatt (2013) found that blocks that contained a school had more motor vehicle thefts and 
felony assaults during school hours. However, in contrast, these findings were not
consistent for residential areas adjacent to block groups that contained a school. A few 
years later, Willits and colleagues (2013) found support for the positive relationship 
between schools and neighborhood crime, independent of demographic and structural 
controls. Further, they found that different schools were associated with higher levels of 
different crimes. Willits et al. (2013) found that high schools were related to increased 
rates of aggravated assaults, larceny, and narcotic-related crimes. Neighborhoods 
containing middle schools were also found to have higher rates of narcotic crimes.
Lastly, they found that areas near elementary schools had lower rates of property crimes. 
Willits and colleagues (2013) linked their findings to one of the basic components of 
social disorganization theory, unsupervised teens. Shaw and McKay (1942) suggested 
that the presence of unsupervised teens was a symptom of social disorganization and 
contributed to higher levels of neighborhood crime. Willits et al. (2013) proposed that 
high schools and middle schools promoted social disorganization because of the increase 
in the number of unsupervised teens.
The social institution of education, as studied by schools, has been found to be 
both beneficial and damaging to neighborhoods. The institution of religion, as expressed 
through the organization of the church, has also received theoretical and empirical 
attention, but again the findings have been mixed.
Traditionally the institution of religion has been assumed to be related to lower 
levels of criminality. Similar to schools, both participation in religious life and churches 
have been theorized to influence socialization, conformity to social norms for their 
patrons, and ultimately lead to reductions in crime. Further, as suggested by Kinney and 
Winter (2006), churches are often viewed as playing a substantial role in neighborhood
31
stability. Empirical evidence however has not found steady confirmation for these 
predictions. Examinations of these organizations at the neighborhood level have found 
differences in their effect depending on participation, denomination, and location.
For example, Lee and Bartkowski (2004) found that religious civic participation 
at the county level was associated with decreases in juvenile and adult homicide rates. 
Regnerus (2003) also found a relationship between religious participation and decreased 
rates of theft and minor delinquency for juveniles. Further, he found that the proportion 
of the community that was identified as adherents to conservative Protestant beliefs was 
strongly, significantly, and negatively associated to both of forms of juvenile 
delinquency. However, research conducted by Ellison, Burr, and McCall (2003) reached 
somewhat contradictory findings. In their work they found that the percent of 
conservative Protestant was positively related to homicide rates in metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs). This finding was not found to be true for non-southern MSAs. These 
findings highlight the importance of regional and social context.
These and similar works have found that participation in religious organizations 
can be associated with lower county levels o f crime. Research that examined the impact 
of churches located within smaller residential areas, however, has had substantially 
different results.
Research conducted by Desmond, Kikuchi, and Morgan (2010) examined the 
relationship of different church congregations and neighborhood crime rates. In their 
work they focused on select violent and property crimes in Indianapolis at the block 
group level from 2000 to 2005. Six categories of congregations were developed, 
including evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, other
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affiliations, and civically engaged congregations. The authors borrowed from Tolbert, 
Lyson, and Irwin (1998) in identifying civically engaged congregations, defining them by 
congregations, which had more volunteer association memberships than average. They 
found that areas that had more evangelical Protestant organizations had significantly 
higher rates of robbery, assault, and aggravated assault. None of the other religious 
denominations included in the analysis were related to increased levels of violent crimes. 
The findings for property crimes were less clear-cut. Vehicle theft was higher in block 
groups that contained evangelical, mainline, and Black Protestant congregations. Church 
locations were not associated with residential burglary. However, church locations were 
associated with commercial burglary, which increased with the presence of all types of 
Protestant congregations, but was reduced by the presence of civically-engaged religious 
organizations. Lastly, rates o f larceny were found to increase in block groups that 
contained evangelical and mainline Protestant churches, and decrease in areas that were 
home to civically engaged churches.
Research by Triplett, White, and Gainey (2013) confirmed many of these 
findings. Specifically, they found that the presence of churches, both evangelical and 
non-evangelical, in block groups was associated with increased levels of street crimes 
and domestic assaults. Both sets of authors highlighted the importance of nonresidential 
commercial use of land as possible explanations of their results. Though the research on 
church placement and neighborhood crime is limited, so far it is consistent.
Research on the impact of bars on neighborhoods has also found relatively 
consistent findings. Roncek was once again at the forefront of this area of research. 
Roncek and Bell (1981) found that having bars located within city blocks of Cleveland
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was associated with increased levels of crime. In a replication of his previous work, 
Roncek and Maier (1991) reexamined the relationship between bars and crime in 
Cleveland between 1979 and 1981. Their work reaffirmed the findings of Roncek and 
Bell (1981), which found that every type of crime that was included in the analysis was 
found to be higher in city blocks that contained bars, compared to blocks without such 
establishments.
More recent research regarding the influence of bars on levels of crime has 
continued to further develop the understanding of this relationship. Nielsen and Martinez
(2003) analyzed this relationship in the racially and culturally diverse city of Miami. In 
their work they found that the availability of alcohol was strongly associated with overall 
violent crime as well as rates of aggravated assault and robbery. Further, work by 
Murray and Roncek (2008) found that having at least one bar in a block resulted in an 
increase in the expected number of aggravated assaults. Their analysis also included 
establishments that sold alcohol, which were found to have even stronger impact on the 
number of aggravated assaults. Expanding on these findings, Pridemore and Grubesic 
(2012) reexamined this relationship in Cincinnati, Ohio. Their findings confirmed 
previous research on the presence of bars and increased rates of assault. However, they 
further found that the effects of bars were tempered by higher levels of community 
organization.
In addition to the research that focused on specific organizations there have been 
a few studies that incorporated several kinds of organizations. Peterson, Krivo, and 
Harris (2000) collected information on residential centers, libraries, employment 
institutions, and bars to examine their effect on crime within census tracts. Their findings
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suggested that bars were positively and significantly related to violent crime rates. In 
their preliminary analysis, none of the other organizations were found to significantly 
affect neighborhood crime. Upon further investigation, however, they discovered that 
recreation centers were related to decreased levels of violent crime, but only in areas of 
extreme economic deprivation. They suggested that recreation centers might be more 
indicative of services and controls than the count of libraries and employment 
institutions.
Following this blueprint, Slocum and colleagues (2013) studied several 
community organizations and their impact on crime in the south Bronx. They found that 
organizations that provided resources, bridging organizations, organizations that served 
at-risk populations, and organizations that supported child and family well-being, were 
associated with lower levels o f violent and property crimes. Their finding of primary 
interest in relation to this research is that institutions that link or bridge communities to 
outside resources were associated with reduced levels of violent and property crimes. 
Slocum et al. (2013) suggested that bridging institutions could reduce crime through 
increased social networks and levels o f parochial control. As further discussed below, 
banks are an institution that could be viewed as a bridge between communities and 
outside resources.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Financial institutions play a vital role in everyday life for persons of all walks of 
life. In addition to handling personal and business finances, they also offer opportunities 
for home, business, and personal loans. There are several types of financial institutions, 
but banks are the most common and frequently used, and will be the focus of this
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research. However, not all communities have equal access to these organizations. 
Research has found that residents in lower income neighborhoods in urban areas have 
fewer banks available to them (Pollard 1996; Small and McDermont 2006). Further, 
access to and presence of banks has been found to be associated with loan acquisition and 
lower rates of mortgage default and crime (Ergunor 2012; Ergunor and Moulton 2011; 
Garmaise and Moskowitz 2006).
BANKS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP AND MORTGAGE 
INVESTMENT
There are several lines of research relating the importance of banking to the 
neighborhood context. First, a concern for the unbanked is that banking has been found 
to be associated with asset accumulation, specifically homeownership. The 2011 FDIC 
National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households (Burhouse and Osaki 2012) 
found that over 78 percent of household respondents who had a bank account and did not 
use any alternative financial services owned their home, while less than 3 percent of 
unbanked households own their home. Low levels of homeownership have been 
associated with social mobility and instability within neighborhoods and communities 
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942), which social 
disorganization theorists have long related to increased levels o f neighborhood crime.
Second, research has connected the presence of bank branches in neighborhoods 
to access to loans of a variety of types including mortgage lending. Ergungor (2010) 
examined the relationship between presence of bank branches in low-income 
neighborhoods and credit availability to the poor. His findings suggested that having a 
bank in the neighborhood allowed for the collection of “soft” information about the
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neighborhood and residents, which improved access to mortgage loans. Ergungor’s 
(2010) research in Ohio has shown that the presence of a bank branch within a low to 
moderate-income neighborhood was positively associated with mortgage origination. 
Additionally, research has consistently found that loans that originate from banks were 
less likely to default compared to loans originated through brokers or companies (see 
Alexander, Grimshaw, McQueen, and Slade 2002; Laderman and Reid 2008; Moulton 
2010).
In a working paper by Ergungor and Moulton (2011) the impact of banks on 
mortgage loans was further clarified in three ways that are important to the research here. 
First, this work confirmed previous works and found that mortgages that were originated 
from a bank were less likely to default than mortgages from nonbanks. Second, their 
work found that in Ohio an increase in bank access in low to moderate-income 
neighborhoods was associated with an increased probability of borrowers choosing a 
bank for their mortgage. Lastly, they found that smaller banks (those that have less than 
ten billion in assets), which were likely to be locally owned, were better at predicting 
mortgage success and creditworthiness. Ergungor and Moulton (2011) suggested that 
banks that had a branch in the area were better informed about the economics of the area 
to which they were lending.
The unbanked are less likely to own their home, indicating the close and 
important relationship that exists between banking and homeownership. Research and 
political rhetoric have suggested that homeownership is related to several positive social, 
psychological and financial outcomes (Shlay 2006). Specifically, the owning of one’s 
home is one of the key sources of wealth accumulation in the United States (Turner and
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Skidmore 1999; Williams, Nesiba, and Mcconnell 2005). Alternatively, low 
homeownership has been associated with social mobility and instability within 
neighborhoods and communities (Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942), which 
social disorganization theorists have long related to neighborhood crime.
Homeownership has been found to increase neighborhood stability and play a 
critical role in community organization (Squires and Kubrin 2006). At the community 
level, research has found that homeowners are more committed to their neighborhoods, 
more likely to participate in community activities or volunteering (Rhoe, Van Zandt, and 
McCarthy 2002; White and Schollaert 1985), and more involved in local elections 
compared to renters (McCabe 2013). Rhoe and colleagues (2002) proposed that 
purchasing a home in a particular area can be viewed as an indication of long-term 
commitment to a community. In fact, homeowners have been found to stay in their 
residence four times as long on average as renters do (Rhoe et al. 2002). In addition to 
increases in stability, increased rates o f homeownership have been associated with 
increased property values (Rhoe et al. 2002; Shlay 2006).
Additionally, research conducted in the Netherlands has found that 
homeownership was positively related to feelings of neighborhood safety and satisfaction 
(Brounen, Cox, and Neuteboom 2012). Research conducted by Alba and colleagues 
(1994) also found a substantial relationship between homeownership and crime rates 
across neighborhoods in the state of New Jersey. According to their findings 
neighborhoods where homeowners resided experienced 250 less violent crimes and 350 
less property crimes per 100,000 persons (1994:412), compared to similar renters’ 
neighborhoods. Further, using data on the 100 largest cities in the United States, White
38
(2001) found that the percentage of homeowners in higher-income cities was associated 
with a decrease in murder rates. However, the rate of homeownership was associated 
with increased rates of burglary in lower-income cities (White 2001:338).
At the individual level, research has found that homeownership was associated 
with lower rates of unemployment, higher wages (Shaly 2006), and increased 
psychological and physical health (Rhoe et al. 2002). Further, research on the effect of 
homeownership on children has uncovered additional positive effects. These findings are 
especially salient for the children for low-income homeowners. Generally, the children 
of homeowners performed better in school and were more likely to graduate, had lower 
rates of teenage pregnancy, higher levels of earnings as adults, and were more likely to 
become homeowners themselves (Boehm and Schlottman 1999, 2002; Green and White 
1997). Additionally, homeownership has been linked with decreased behavioral 
problems in the children of homeowners (Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin 2002).
The theoretical importance from a social disorganization perspective of 
homeownership for neighborhood crime reduction is empirically supported. However, in 
order to achieve homeownership potential buyers need access to mortgages and financial 
resources. Research investigating the relationship between mortgage investment and 
neighborhood crime is relatively new. Several researchers, however, have suggested that 
the investigation of bank loans is important in our understanding of crime as the actions 
of banks play an influential role in the viability of a neighborhood (Garmaise and 
Moskowitz 2006; Squires and O’Connor 2001). Neighborhoods where residents obtain 
loans had opportunities to build new housing, repair old housing, sustain businesses, and
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attract new business owners and homebuyers, while neighborhoods where residents were 
unable to attain home loans struggled with these goals (Velez 2009:155).
Squires and Kubrin (2006) were the first to look for a relationship between 
neighborhood crime and levels of mortgage lending. The authors utilized the 2000 Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HDMA) reports, the 2000 census, and Seattle crime data that 
were aggregated to the census tract level. Focusing on mortgages for the purchase of 
single family homes, they discovered that higher rates of mortgage lending were 
associated with decreased rates of violent and property crime. Their findings remained 
significant even after controlling for factors that have been long found to be associated 
with neighborhood crime, such as disadvantage and residential mobility.
Peterson and Kivro (2009b) conducted similar analyses to further investigate the 
importance that racial and ethnic segregation play in understanding the relationship 
between home lending and neighborhood crime. Using data from National 
Neighborhood Crime Study and the HDMA reports, they were able to compare similar 
neighborhoods across the United States. In their analysis they included residential 
lending as a total of the conventional and FHA/VA mortgage loans, home improvement, 
and refinancing loans. In their analyses they found that residential lending reduced the 
difference between rates of violent crime between white, black, and Latino 
neighborhoods. Research conducted by Saporu and colleagues (2011) reaffirmed the 
differential benefits o f residential lending in racial and ethnic neighborhoods. Overall, 
similar to previous work, residential lending was found to be related to lower rates of 
violent and property crime across all neighborhoods. However, the benefit of residential 
lending was greater in minority neighborhoods, and higher levels of investment were
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found to be more beneficial to these neighborhoods as well (Saporu, Patton, Krivo, and 
Peterson 2011).
Research conducted by Maria Velez further highlights the importance of 
residential loans in neighborhood crime rates. In her first work on the topic, Velez 
(2009) examined the impact of bank investment on homicide rates in racially and 
ethnically different Chicago neighborhoods between 1993 and 1995. In this work she 
conceptualized residential lending as a form of decision-making that was external to the 
neighborhood, suggestive of the political economy aspect of social disorganization 
theory. She conducted this research using HDMA reports, Chicago homicide data, and 
1990 census data, all aggregated to the census tract level, which was used to define a 
neighborhood. Residential lending was conceptualized in the same way as discussed 
above. Similar to previous findings (Peterson and Krivo 2009a; 2009b; Squires and 
O’Connor 2001), Velez found that predominately white census tracts received 
substantially larger amounts of home loan dollars than African American and Latino 
census tracts. On average census tracts that were predominantly white received $12 
million in home loans a year, compared to $1.5 million and $3 million for African 
American and Latino census tracts respectively.
Velez (2009) discovered that neighborhoods that received outside investment 
from banks, in the form of home loans, had lower rates o f homicide. More specifically, 
for each additional million a neighborhood received in home loans the homicide rate 
decreased three percent, holding all other variables constant. Or, in an average Chicago 
neighborhood, an additional one million in home loans resulted in one less homicide 
every three years. To explain these findings she suggested that:
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Infusions of bank capital give tools to neighborhoods to control crime: either 
informally through neighbor interactions, by providing resources to fix up 
housing and other buildings, or by expanding local economic opportunities (Velez 
2009:165).
Regarding minority neighborhoods, Velez (2009) found residential lending was 
associated with a decrease in lethal violence. Minority neighborhoods in Chicago had 
substantially higher homicide rates than average, and residential lending reduced this 
disparity in both African American and Latino neighborhoods.
Velez and Richardson (2012) aimed to further understand the role of home loans 
on homicide in Chicago. A vital improvement from previous works was the inclusion of 
spatial analysis. Including spatial analysis allows researchers to discover how nearby 
neighborhoods are affecting one another. In these analyses this would mean that high 
rates of residential lending in a neighborhood would not only benefit that neighborhood, 
but those surrounding it at well. This research utilized data similar to Velez (2009) and 
census tracts as a proxy for neighborhoods; however, neighborhoods were categorized by 
their homicide rate rather than their racial and ethnic composition. Chicago 
neighborhoods were categorized as below-average, above-average or average homicide 
rates. Neighborhoods that had a homicide rate below average received the most home 
loan dollars, followed by average, and neighborhoods that had above average homicide 
rates received the least residential loans.
The results of Velez and Richardson’s research (2012) supported previous 
research findings. The influx of home loan dollars into neighborhoods was associated 
with a reduction in rates of homicide. More specifically, while holding all other variables
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constant, a one standard deviation increase in home loan dollars resulted in a predicted 
11.5 percent decrease in the homicide rate. Further, the homicide rate of a neighborhood 
further decreased if it was embedded in other neighborhoods that were receiving home 
loans. These findings support the prediction of political economy theory that outside 
influences play a role in neighborhoods. In both Velez (2009) and Velez and Richardson 
(2012), however, the authors mentioned the potential for a reciprocal relationship where 
prior rates of crime were influencing the amount of home loans a neighborhood received, 
as other research has suggested (see White 2001).
Velez et al. (2012) explored this possibility in their research on residential lending 
and violent crime in Seattle. Their study utilized longitudinal data from 1981-2007 on 
violent crime in Seattle, residential lending and census data from 1980, 1990, 2000, and 
the 2005-2009 American Community Survey. Their findings outlined the substantial 
increase in homeownership since the 1980s. In 1980, the average neighborhood in 
Seattle received 200,000 dollars in residential lending, but by 1990 this had increased to 
almost 600,000 dollars. By 2000 residential lending was almost two million a year in the 
average neighborhood.
Velez et al. (2012) further affirmed previous findings that suggested that 
residential lending reduces neighborhood rates of violent crime. However, in contrast to 
previous research they found that the effect o f residential lending on violent crime was 
similar across racial, ethnic, and economic lines. Further, they also examined the 
importance of time lags in the understanding of this relationship. In this work, they 
tested lags up to five years in length, and found that lending levels longer than two years 
prior were statistically non-significant. The time lags suggested for the relationship
43
between residential lending and neighborhood crime are one and two years. Using the 
one and two year lags, no evidence of violent crime predicting mortgage lending was 
found.
While the literature on the effect of mortgage and home loans is limited, it is 
growing. However, research on banks, which play a crucial role in loan acquisition, 
present a considerable gap in the criminological literature.
BANKS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME
There is a growing literature on the wrongdoing of banks (see Kirk 2012; Nguyen 
and Pontell 2010); however, the effect of banks on neighborhoods and their levels of 
crime is substantially more limited. Research conducted by Garmaise and Moskowitz
(2004) found that banking transactions were reasonably localized, meaning that residents 
banked near their home. Further, they found that banking did have an effect on the 
neighborhood within which it is located. Specifically, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) 
found that when there was a decrease in banking competition, due to bank mergers, there 
was a decrease in banking quality, and higher interest banking loans. All of these were 
associated with an increase in property crimes in the surrounding area.
Fairchild and Rai (2011) conducted a case study on the Latino Community Credit 
Union established in North Carolina. They examined the potential effects of new 
financial institutions for an underserved minority. In their work they found that the 
presence of a bank in the neighborhood reduced robberies and increased property values 
in the area. Within one year of the opening of the credit union, police data suggested that 
reports of robberies against Latinos had dropped almost 23 percent in the area. In fact, in
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four of the five cities that Latino Community Credit Unions were founded experienced 
decreased rates of robberies after their opening (Fairchild and Rai 2011).
Slocum et al. (2013) found that organizations that connected communities with 
outside resources were associated with reduced rates of crime. One of the categories of 
organizations that were included in this group was focused on economic development. 
Although the article does not specify what organizations were included in the category of 
economic development, it is likely that banks could fit into this group. This finding lends 
additional support for further investigation into the effect of financial institutions on 
crime.
There is some empirical evidence that suggests that banks could have a different 
effect on neighborhood crime. Lee, Gainey, and Triplett (2014) found that neighborhoods 
that contain or are near banks have higher rates o f violent and property crime. This 
research however, did not examine the potential for an interaction between banks and 
neighborhood disadvantage, which the existing literature would suggest is possible. 
Although these findings are contradictory to the small amount of literature that exists, it 
further exemplifies why further investigation into banks and crime is needed.
HYPOTHESES
From the prior literature and the questions that are guiding this research, several 
hypotheses have been developed. The research by Ergungor (2010) found that access to 
nearby financial institutions had a positive effect on the availability lending for residents 
of lower income neighborhoods. His findings indicated that having a bank branch nearby 
allowed for the collection of information on the neighborhood and its residents. From 
these findings, it is hypothesized that
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HI: Neighborhoods that have a bank nearby will receive greater levels o f  
institutional investment.
H I a: Neighborhoods that have a locally operated bank nearby will result in 
greater investment from lending institutions.
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) found that banking was an activity that was relatively 
localized, and that a lack of banking competition was associated with increased 
occurrences of property crimes. Using this research, the second set of hypotheses was 
developed.
H2: Having a bank nearby will result in lower levels o f neighborhood crime.
H2a: Neighborhoods that have a locally operated bank nearby will experience 
lower levels o f crime.
The existing literature has found that the amount of mortgage lending a neighborhood 
receives decreases violent and property crimes experienced. However, although Velez 
and Richardson (2012) suggested that home improvement and refinancing loans might 
differently impact neighborhoods and the amount of crimes they experience, previous 
literature has not examined different forms of lending.
H3: Neighborhoods with greater levels o f investment will benefit from lower 
levels o f neighborhood crime.
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The fourth hypothesis brings the components of the previous hypotheses and findings
into a complete model to understand the impact of prior levels of crime, having a bank
nearby, and mortgage investment on current levels of neighborhood crime.
H4: Any effect o f banks on crime in an neighborhood will be mediated through 
residential loans.




Figure 1 displays the theoretical model suggested from the prior literature, which 
will be tested in hypothesis 4. It was hypothesized that the neighborhood characteristics 
of concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and racial heterogeneity will affect 
where banks are located. Further, it was hypothesized that the effect of banks on 
neighborhood levels of crime would work through residential lending. Why? It was 
theorized that banks affected levels of residential lending because of their role in asset 
accumulation and the collection of soft information. Soft information includes factors 
that are not included in credit and risk scoring, such as spending habits, overdraft
occurrences, and bill payment history. The infusion of resources into neighborhoods in 
the form of mortgage, refinancing, and home improvement loans can increase social ties, 
organizational participation, residential stability, and social control in the neighborhood 
by increasing homeownership. Mortgages are vital to homeownership, as most people do 
not have enough cash on hand to make such a substantial purchase. Though not all 
mortgages are originated through banks, they do play a crucial role in loan acquisition.
First, research has consistently found that mortgages that were originated from 
depository banks were less likely to fall into default (Ergungor and Moulton 2011). As 
discussed above, mortgage foreclosure has been found to be associated with higher rates 
o f crime, even when controlling for other neighborhood characteristics (Teasdale et al. 
2012). Second, having access to a bank increases asset accumulation, which is needed 
for loan application. Finally, refinancing loans can be viewed as a recommitment to the 





As covered in the previous chapter, there is a growing body of knowledge on the 
role of institutions on neighborhoods and crime. However, the existing literature rarely 
examined banks and their relationship to neighborhood crime. Beyond the contribution 
of focusing on banks, the current study expands the existing literature on banks and 
neighborhood crime in an additional three ways.
First, the use of the cities of Norfolk and Virginia Beach offered a test of the 
relationship between banks and crime in two additional contexts. So far the existing 
literature has only focused on a limited number of cities, mostly larger ones, particularly 
Chicago (Velez 2009; Velez and Richardson 2012) and Seattle (Squires and Kubrin 2006; 
Velez et al. 2012). The research that has focused on more than one city has only included 
cities that had populations over 300,000 (Peterson and Krivo 2009a). Second, past 
research has emphasized homicide and violent crimes. Three types of crimes, violent, 
property and vandalism, are investigated in the analysis that follows to see if residential 
lending has effects on crimes other than violent ones. Third, rather than using a 
combined measure o f lending, the current research will use both a combined measure of 
lending and disaggregated measures of mortgage, refinancing, and home improvement 
loans.
DATA
The data for the analyses was collected from five sources. The data that was used 
in the construction of the crime variables was provided by the Norfolk and Virginia
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Beach Police Departments. The data from the police departments was comprised of 
crimes known to the police and the location where the crime occurred at the block level. 
The crime data utilized in this research was for the years of 2008, 2010, and 2012.
The second source of data was the mortgage data available through the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act. This act became permanent in 1988 and requires most U.S. 
financial institutions to gather and publically disclose information regarding home loan 
applications in urban areas. Financial institutions that are required to report include 
banks, credit unions, and savings institutions that have total assets more than $39 million, 
and for-profit mortgage lenders who have assets greater than $10 million (Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council 2010; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Squires and 
O’Connor 2001). The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council produces 
annual reports from the reporting institutions that are organized by the census tract 
location of the property the loan is for.
Presently, data as recent as 2011 are obtainable online at the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) website. The reports for the 2007, 2009, 2010, 
and 2011 loans purchased by census tract were used for data collection. Although this 
data has been widely used for analysis of the discriminatory practice of redlining, there is 
concern over the lack of information that is provided. More specifically, information 
regarding the borrower’s credit record is not included, which has resulted in concern for 
conclusions that can be drawn about racial discrimination in lending practices (Benston 
1997; Squires and O’Connor 2001). This study however looked at neighborhood level 
differences in lending, not individual differences. Due to the aggregate focus on 
neighborhoods the data was well suited for the purposes of this study.
The third source of data is the Polk City Directories for the cities of Norfolk and 
Virginia Beach in 2007, 2009, and 2011. The Polk City Directories are produced by the 
Polk Company, which uses local phonebooks to create comprehensive reports of 
businesses and residents each year for over 1,000 cities across the United States. This 
source was used to collect the names and addresses of banks in Norfolk and Virginia 
Beach. It is possible that not every bank that was present in Norfolk and Virginia Beach 
in 2007,2009, and 2011 was listed in the directories. However, in order to conduct 
business they need to be found, so it is probable that most banks are in the directory and 
thus their use should not cause serious bias in the data.
The final source of data was from the 2000 Census. Data from this resource was 
used to create several control variables included in the analyses.
Following the existing literature on the investment of financial institutions the 
unit of analysis for this research was census tracts (see Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b; 
Squires and O’Connor 2001; Velez 2009; Velez and Richardson 2012; Velez et al. 2012). 
Bursik and Grasmick (1993) and many other researchers have highlighted the difficulty 
of defining and designating neighborhoods. Specifically, census designations are 
sometimes viewed as problematic because natural and artificial barriers, such as rivers 
and major roads, influence them. Using census tracts, it is possible that the designations 
are not meaningful within the city and community. Recently, however, Hipp (2013) has 
suggested the use of census tracts as representations for neighborhoods was beneficial 
because they have been used frequently in research, and because when the Census Bureau 
initially developed designations they were thought to be homogeneous neighborhoods.
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Though there are smaller census designations, census tracts are utilized because the 
mortgage data being used was organized by the 2000 tract designations.
The city of Norfolk contains 84 census tracts and Virginia Beach contains 87. 
Following previous research by Velez (2009) and Velez and Richardson (2012), the 
sample used for this study was limited to census tracts that had at least a population of 
100 people. Other tracts were excluded from the analysis because they included military 
bases or were tourist areas. These tracts were excluded because they had fluid 
populations that change often and include nonresidents. In Norfolk, this resulted in the 
exclusion of three census tracts, two for having a navy base, and one for having a 
population less than 100. In Virginia Beach this resulted in the exclusion of four census 
tracts, one for the naval air station, and three for being high tourist areas. The three 
census tracts excluded from Virginia Beach for tourism have lots of people but most of 
them are not residents. In 2008, Virginia Beach had nearly 2.5 million visitors who 
stayed overnight, ranging from 120,000 visitors a month in the off-season, to 357,000 in 
the peak months (Yochum and Agarwal 2009). This large, but temporary population 
results in extremely high rates of crime, and was excluded for that reason.
Accounting for these exceptions, the analyses included 81 tracts in Norfolk with a 
minimum population of 350, a max of 7,502, and an average population of 2,602, and 83 
tracts in Virginia Beach with a minimum population of 1,055, a maximum of 9,527, and 
an average population of 4,821.
DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The occurrence of vandalism and composite measures for violent and property 
crimes served as the primary dependent variables. The first variable was the number of
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acts o f vandalism for 2008, 2010, and 2012. The composite measures for violent crime 
and property crime used were conceptualized by prior research, specifically, Velez et al. 
(2012) and Slocum et al. (2013), respectively. The measure of violent crime included the 
number of homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults for 2008, 2010, and 2012. 
The measure of property crime was composed of the count of burglaries, larcenies, and 
motor vehicle thefts for the years of 2008, 2010, and 2012. They were geocoded using 
the block addresses for the general location of each crime event and then aggregated to 
the census tract level.
The primary independent variables for the study were residential lending variables 
that were measured by total dollar amount in thousands of home mortgages originated in 
each census tract, as several researchers have before (Peterson and Kivro 2009a; 2009b; 
Saporu et al. 2011). In order to build upon the existing work, the composite measure of 
total loan dollars was then disaggregated, which is something that previous research has 
not been able to do. Velez and Richardson (2012) suggest in a footnote that these 
different types of loans could have different effects on neighborhoods and their levels of 
crime. Therefore FHA/VA home loan dollars, which included loans insured by various 
agencies of the federal government, conventional home loan dollars, refinancing loan 
dollars, and home improvement loan dollars were included. The lending variables were 
also used as dependent variables in the testing of three of the hypotheses listed above.
The presence of institutions was examined at the census tract level, by using the 
addresses of banks from the Polk City Directories. The inclusion of banks in census 
tracts allows for examination into the role of institutional presence of financial 
organizations. The addresses of banks were geocoded and aggregated to the census tract
53
level to create the independent variable of number o f banks. The dichotomy o f local 
banks was determined by online searches to see where the bank’s headquarters was 
located and a dummy variable was created. Banks that had their headquarters in Norfolk 
or Virginia Beach were considered to have local ownership. Bank locations were 
geocoded using the census Tiger Line file street map, and then aggregated to the census 
tract level in the Arc GIS statistical program.
CONTROL VARIABLES
The control variables for the analyses were collected from the 2000 Census. 
Following the previous literature, two indexes were created to measure concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability. Taken from Peterson, Krivo and Harris, the 
measure of concentrated disadvantage included (1) the percent of the tract that were in 
poverty, (2) percentage of single headed households, (3) the percent of the population 16 
and older that were unemployed, and (4) percent of the population 16 and older that were 
employed in professional or managerial occupations (reverse coded) (2000:41). To 
control for racial heterogeneity, the plan was to measure the percent black of the tract. 
However, there was substantial multicollinearity between the percent black of the tract 
and concentrated disadvantage. As a result the percent black o f the tract was included in 
the scale for concentrated disadvantage. Concentrated Disadvantage had a Crohnbach’s 
alpha of 0.81. The measure of residential instability was taken from Peterson and Krivo 
(2009a; 2009b), who created a scale that included the percent of residents over five years 
of age that lived somewhere different five years prior, and the percent of renter-occupied 
dwellings. For the scale of residential instability, the Cronbach’s alpha was 0.82. Lastly, 
city was included as a dichotomous variable to examine if there was any difference
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between Norfolk and Virginia Beach that was not accounted for by the included 
neighborhood control variables.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Spatial analysis was used to further understand the relationships between the 
variables. Research conducted by Heitgerd and Bursik (1987) was one of the first to 
suggest that delinquency in one neighborhood was influenced by levels of delinquency in 
adjoining neighborhoods. Peterson and Krivo (2009a) described the borders of 
neighborhoods as permeable, and as being affected by the characteristics and events of 
nearby communities. In their work they have found considerable support for the 
importance of studying spatial influences. Additional research has repeatedly found 
spatial effects on neighborhood levels of crime (see Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Mears and 
Bhati 2006; Peterson and Krivo 2009a, 2009b). In addition, Velez and Richardson 
(2012) posited that it was likely that mortgage lending also has a spatial effect, as the 
neighborhood and the neighborhoods that surround it are considered in lending requests. 
Their work confirmed the notion that finding that mortgage lending was not just 
beneficial for the neighborhood that received it, but for the surrounding neighborhoods as 
well.
Following prior literature, to include the impact of nearby tracts the spatial lag for 
the variables of total loan dollars, the disaggregated lending variables, the number o f  
banks, dichotomy o f local banks, and the crime variables of vandalism, property crime 
and violent crime were constructed by use of the queen criterion for the autocorrelation 
weighing factor. Anselin (2002) explained queen criterion as the inclusion of 
neighborhoods that share boundaries and vertices with the neighborhood in question.
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This criterion is used to include all neighborhoods that surround a particular 
neighborhood, as being on the edge of boundaries or vertices may have important 
characteristics such as major roads or intersections.
Negative binominal regression is commonly used in criminological research when 
the dependent variable is a count rather than a rate. Poisson-based regression models 
such as negative binominal regression are better suited for counts of events than linear 
regression. This is because their assumptions are more closely aligned with the nature of 
events, such as only including discrete and positive integers (Osgood 2000). Further, 
negative binomial regression is less restrictive than Poisson regressions, and is able to 
accurately represent data with high zero counts (Land, McCall, and Nagin 1996). In line 
with prior literature, and for the reasons outlined above, negative binominal regression is 
employed as the main method of analysis in examining banks, lending, and crime.
The final stage of analysis tests for the possibility of reciprocal causation, which 
has been suggested as a possibility by previous research (Velez 2009; Velez and 
Richardson 2012). Through some research in Seattle, Velez et al. (2012) found that there 
was no statistically significant relationship between prior levels of neighborhood crime 
and the amount of mortgage investment received, it is possible that such a relationship 






Table 1 shows the minimum, maximum, mean, and total for all of the variables 
included in the study for Norfolk and Virginia Beach census tracts included in the 
analyses. For Norfolk’s banking variables, there were a total of 65 banks in the included 
census tracts in 2009, 51 of the census tracts included did not have a bank, while several 
tracts had multiple bank locations. Further, 12 census tracts had a locally owned bank 
within their boundaries. Overall the census tracts included for Norfolk in the analyses 
received almost 700 million dollars in home loans in 2009. The majority of that 
residential investment was in the form of refinancing loans, followed by FHA/VA loans. 
Less than 100 million of the loan dollars received were from conventional and home 
improvement loans.
For Virginia Beach, there were a total of 103 banks in the census tracts included 
in the analyses. Forty-two of the Virginia Beach census tracts, which is about half, did 
not have banks within their boundaries. Further, 20 census tracts have at least one locally 
owned bank. Overall the census tracts included for Virginia Beach included in the 
analyses received over 1.9 billion dollars in home loans in 2009. The majority of that 
residential investment was in the form of refinancing loans, followed by FHA/VA loans. 
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Looking at the crime variables for Norfolk, most census tracts included in the 
analyses reported violent crimes, and all reported property and vandalism crimes. More 
specifically, only 10 census tracts did not report a violent crime in 2012, while on 
average census tracts reported about 9 violent crimes. All census tracts included in the 
analyses reported property crimes, with the minimum of 6 reported and a maximum of 
almost 400, showing there was a wide range in the number of property crimes reported to 
the police. At 71, he average number of property crimes reported was substantially lower 
than the maximum. Additionally, all census tracts included in the analyses reported acts 
of vandalism, with the minimum being 3 for a tract and the maximum being one 166.
The average was 42 acts of vandalism reported per census tract.
Looking at the crime variables, most census tracts in Virginia Beach included in 
the analyses reported violent crimes, and all reported property and vandalism crimes. 
More specifically, only 5 census tracts did not report a violent crime in 2012, while on 
average census tracts reported about 9 violent crimes, which was similar to Norfolk. All 
census tracts included in the analyses reported property crimes, with the minimum 
reported being 18 and the maximum being 509, showing there was a wide range in the 
number of property crimes reported to the police. The average number of property 
crimes reported by a census tract was substantially higher than Norfolk’s at 
approximately 122. Additionally, all census tracts included in the analyses reported acts 
of vandalism, with the minimum being 3 for a tract, which was the same as Norfolk. The 
maximum number of reported acts of vandalism was 150, which was less than was 
reported in Norfolk. The average was 42 acts of vandalisms reported per census tract, 
which was also the same as Norfolk.
The social disorganization variables of concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability are scales that range from negative to positive values, with a mean of zero. 
Negative values on these variables indicate a lack of their presence. Of the tracts 
included for Norfolk about one-third had negative levels o f residential instability, or in 
other words, were less unstable. While the majority, approximately two-thirds, had 
positive levels of residential instability or were unstable. For concentrated disadvantage, 
less than half of the tracts included had negative levels, or were less disadvantaged on the 
measures included in this scale. The remaining tracts had positive indications of 
concentrated disadvantage, with the maximum being over 3.5, which would be high 
levels of concentrated disadvantage. The mean for Norfolk was positive, indicating that 
on average tracts were disadvantaged.
Of the tracts included for Virginia Beach about two-thirds had negative levels of 
residential instability, which was the opposite of the findings for Norfolk, indicating that 
tracts in Virginia Beach tracts were more stable. For concentrated disadvantage, almost 
80 percent of the tracts included had negative levels, or were less disadvantaged on the 
measures included in the scale. The remaining tracts had positive indications of 
concentrated disadvantage, with the maximum being over just over 1.5, which was 
substantially lower than Norfolk. The mean was negative, indicating that on average 
tracts were less disadvantaged. Figure 2 visualizes concentrated disadvantage for the 
cities of Norfolk and Virginia Beach.
60
Figure 2. Norfolk and Virginia Beach by Concentrated Disadvantage
As outlined above, the two cities in this research had substantial differences in their 
lending and social disorganization characteristics. Norfolk’s census tracts had high levels 
of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability compared to Virginia Beach 
census tracts. Because of these differences, for each analysis the two cities were 
examined together first, and if the variable for city was significant when added into the 
final model, then Norfolk and Virginia Beach were analyzed separately.
HYPOTHESIS 1
HI: Neighborhoods that have a bank nearby will receive greater levels o f  
institutional investment
The results shown in Tables 2 and 3, and Appendix Tables 1 through 3, display 
the findings regarding the first hypothesis that having a bank nearby increases levels of
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institutional investment. There are a number of important findings. First, the data do not 
support this hypothesis and, in fact, the opposite was found. Having a bank in the census 
tract or nearby decreases the loan dollars received when one of these variables was 
significant. Second, interestingly for all of the analyses of bank locations and loan 
dollars, except for FHA/VA loans, there was a significant difference between Norfolk 
and Virginia Beach. The analyses confirm that Virginia Beach census tracts consistently 
received more loan dollars than Norfolk. Finally, the variable for residential instability 
had varying effects, depending on the loan type. For total, refinancing, and home 
improvement loans, increases in instability were associated with decreases in loan dollars 
received. However, increases in residential instability were associated with the increases 
in conventional loan dollars that a census tract received. Overall, the analyses indicate 
that banks do appear to have some effect on lending, though census tract characteristics 
appear to be most important, both independently and in terms of shaping the effects of the 
presence of banks.
Table 2 displays the results from the negative binomial models predicting 2009 
total residential lending. In model 1, the main independent variable of the number of 
banks in each census tract in 2009, and the spatial lag of lending and banks were 
examined. The analysis shows that the spatial lag of total loans was significant in a 
positive direction, indicating that census tracts receiving residential loans results in more 
loans for the tracts surrounding. This is consistent with previous findings indicating that 
residential loans have benefits beyond their own neighborhood (Peterson and Krivo 
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The second model included the theoretically relevant variables of concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability. In this model it was found that in addition to the 
spatial lag of total lending that was significant in the first model, concentrated 
disadvantage (p < .001), and residential instability (p < .10) were statically significant. 
The findings indicated each standard deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage 
resulted in a predicted 35 percent decrease (e '43 = 0.65) in residential lending. For 
residential instability, a one standard deviation increase in instability was associated with 
a predicted 18 percent decrease (e '20 = 0.82) in total residential loans received by a 
census tract. The third model added in a control for city, which was statistically 
significant (p < .01), signifying that if a census tract was in the city of Norfolk the total 
loan dollars decreased by a predicted 51 percent (e‘72 = 0.49).
Since the control for city was significant when looking at the two cities together, 
the next step is to look at the two cities separately. In the first model for Norfolk total 
lending, none of the variables were significant. When the social disorganization variables 
were added in the second model the spatial lag of banks in 2009 became significant 
(p < .05). The results for the spatial lag of banks indicate a predicted decrease in total 
loans by 23 percent (e‘26 = 0.77), and for concentrated disadvantage a standard deviation 
increase was associated with a 36 percent decrease (e '45 = 0.64).
In the first Virginia Beach model the spatial lag for lending was significant 
(p<.10). However, it is in a negative direction, indicating that census tracts receiving 
residential loans resulted in fewer loans for the surrounding tracts. This was the opposite 
of what the model that included both cities found. In the second model, when the social 
disorganization variables were included, the spatial lag of total lending was no longer
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significant. Residential instability was significant {p < .05), indicating that a one 
standard deviation increase in instability was associated with a predicted reduction in 
total lending of 29 percent (e '34 = 0.71).
The next step in the analysis was to examine the different kinds of loans 
disaggregated to examine if banks had different effects on each kind. Looking at home 
purchasing loans acquired through the Veterans Administration and Federal Housing 
Administration (VA/FHA) the analysis indicated that only the variable concentrated 
disadvantage was statistically significant. As shown in Appendix Table 1, in the second 
model, concentrated disadvantaged was associated with a 20 percent decrease (e '22 =
0.80) in VA/FHA loan dollars received by a census tract. In the third model, city was 
controlled for but was not statistically significant, the variable o f disadvantage was 
significant (p < .10) and was associated with a decrease of 17 percent (e~ 19=0.83) in 
VA/FHA loan dollars received.
The analysis for conventional home loans and bank locations in 2009 is presented 
in Table 3. The first model for the two cities indicated that only the spatial lag of 
conventional loans was significant. In the second model, the social disorganization 
variables were included. The addition of these variables changed the spatial lag of bank 
locations to be significant {p < .10). The results indicated a 14 percent decrease (e'
16 = 0.86) in conventional loan dollars received if there was a bank in a census tract 
nearby. Further, the variables for the spatial lag of conventional loans, concentrated 
disadvantage and instability were significant. The findings indicated that for a standard 
deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage there was a reduction of 58 percent (e '88 
= 0.42) of conventional loan dollars received. An increase in residential instability,
65
however, was associated with an increase of conventional loan dollars of 23 percent 
(e 21 = 1.23). The third model included the control for city, which reduced the effect of 
the spatial lag of lending to non-significant. The remaining variables that were 
significant in the second model were still significant in the same direction, and the 
control for city was significant, indicating that Norfolk received 53 percent less 
(e 75 = 0.47) in conventional loan dollars.
An examination of Norfolk and Virginia Beach separately indicated that there 
were significant differences between them. For Norfolk, in the first model none of the 
variables were significant, then with the addition of the social disorganization variables in 
the second model, the spatial lag of bank locations, concentrated disadvantage, and 
instability were statistically significant (p < .001). The significant finding of the spatial 
lag of banks indicated that having a bank in a census tract nearby was associated with a 
decrease of 39 percent (e '50 = 0.61), which was similar to what was found looking at the 
two cities together.
This change suggests the idea of an interaction effect, which could be driving the 
results for the two cities combined. Further, a standard deviation increase in concentrated 
disadvantage suggested a 60 percent decrease (e‘92 = 0.40) in conventional loan dollars 
received and an increase of one standard deviation increase in residential instability was 
associated with a predicted increase of 86 percent (e62 = 1.86) of conventional loan 
dollars. In the Virginia Beach models, the only variable significant in either of the 
models was concentrated disadvantage, suggesting that an increase of one standard 
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The analyses for refinancing loans are available in Appendix Table 2. In the first 
model for the two cities, only the spatial lag for refinancing loans was significant. In the 
second model, the social disorganization variables were added and were found to be 
statistically significant. There was a decrease of 37 percent (e '46 = 0.63) for each 
standard deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage and of 24 percent (e '28 = 0.76) 
for a standard deviation increase in instability. The third model includes the control for 
city, which was significant, suggesting a 56 percent decrease (e '81 = 0.44) in refinancing 
loan dollars received if a census tract was in Norfolk. Further, the inclusion of city 
changes the spatial lag of banks to significant ip < .10), suggesting a 13 percent decrease 
(e‘ 14 = 0.87) in refinancing loans received if there was a bank in a census track nearby.
Looking at Norfolk alone, the first model did not contain any significant 
variables. In the second model, the spatial lag of banks was significant (p < .05), as is 
concentrated disadvantage (p < .001). Having a bank in a nearby census track resulted in 
a 22 percent decrease (e '25 = 0.78) in refinancing loan dollars received, and a decrease of 
35 percent (e' 43 = 0.65) for each standard deviation increase in concentrated 
disadvantage.
The analyses for Virginia Beach produced different results from Norfolk. In the 
first model, the spatial lag of refinancing loans was statistically significant ip < .05). 
However, it is in a negative direction, suggesting that if a census tract received home 
refinancing loans, surround neighborhoods would receive less home refinancing loan 
dollars. In the second model, the addition of the social disorganization variables slightly 
reduced the impact of the spatial lag of refinancing loans. However, it was still 
significant (p < .10). Further, residential instability was significant, suggesting that a
68
standard deviation increase in instability was associated with a 33 percent reduction 
(e 40 = 0.67) in refinancing loan dollars received.
The analyses for home improvement loans and bank locations are in Appendix 
Table 3. Analyzing the two cities together, the first model had no significant variables.
In the second model the social disorganization variables were both statistically 
significant, and the addition of these changed the spatial lag of home improvement loans 
to significant. For home improvement loans, a standard deviation increase in 
concentrated disadvantage suggested a 46 percent decrease (e '62 = .54) and a standard 
deviation increase in residential instability was associated with a 23 percent decrease (e‘
27 = 0.77). The third model added the control for city, and this variable and the same 
variables from model 2 were significant. The control for city indicated that Norfolk 
census tracts were associated with a 47 percent decrease (e"64 = 0.53) in home 
improvement loan dollars received.
Looking at the cities separately, there were small differences in the variables that 
were found to be significant between the two cities and the analyses above. As has been 
seen previously, in the first Norfolk model none of the variables were statistically 
significant, but when the theoretically relevant social disorganization variables were 
included, the spatial lag of bank location became significant at the p  < .001 level. The 
results indicated that a 37 percent decrease (e '46 = 0.63) in home improvement dollar 
loans received by census tracts that have a bank in a nearby census tract. Further, an 
increase of one standard deviation in concentrated disadvantage was associated with a 53 
percent decrease (e '78 = 0.46) in home improvement loan dollars received. However in 
the Virginia Beach models, only residential instability was statistically associated with
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home improvement lending. In the second model an increase in residential instability 
suggested a 38 percent decrease (e '49 = 0.62) in home improvement loan dollars received. 
Hla: Having a locally operated bank nearby will result in greater investment 
from lending institutions
The analyses shown in Table 4 and Appendix Tables 4 through 7 display the 
results of the test of hypothesis la, and show an interesting pattern of results. Similar to 
hypothesis 1, this hypothesis was not supported by the findings. The variables for local 
banks were sometimes found to be significant in the first model. However, when the 
social disorganization variables were included the effects of the local banks were no 
longer statistically significant. The findings for the effects of concentrated disadvantage 
and residential instability were consistent with what was found in the analyses for 
hypothesis 1. Overall, in terms of lending, whether the bank was locally owned was not 
found to be important, although census tract characteristics were.
The findings of the negative binomial regressions to analyze total loan dollars as 
predicted by 2009 local banks are found in Table 4. Looking at the two cities together, 
the first model included the spatial lag of total loans, the dichotomous variable for local 
banks and the spatial lag of this variable. As in the models from the first hypothesis, the 
spatial lag of total loan dollars was significant, indicating that census tracts receiving 
residential loans affected surrounding tracts’ loan acquisition. The second model 
included the variables of concentrated disadvantage and instability, which were both 
significant. These findings indicated that a standard deviation increase in disadvantage 
was associated with a decrease of 34 percent (e‘41 = 0.66) in total loan dollars received, 
and a decrease of 19 percent (e 21 = 0.81) with an increase in residential instability. The
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third model included the control variable for city. It was significant (p < .01), indicating 
that a decrease in total loan dollars if the census tract was in Norfolk, and supporting 
further analyses.
Looking at model 1 for Norfolk, none of the variables were statically significant. 
The second model included concentrated disadvantage and residential instability. Again 
increases in disadvantage were associated with decreases in the total loans that a census 
tract received. The Virginia Beach models followed the same process, and in the first 
model only the spatial lag for total lending was significant. In Virginia Beach, having a 
locally operated bank in your census tract did not have a statistically significant impact 
on total loan dollars. The second model indicated that residential instability was 
associated with a 28 percent decrease (e‘33 = 0.72) in total loan dollars received.
As found with VA/FHA in the first hypothesis’ analyses, only concentrated 
disadvantage was statistically significant (p < .10) in any of the models. In the second 
model, Appendix Table 4, concentrated disadvantaged resulted in a predicted 18 percent 
decrease (e"20 = 0.82) in VA/FHA loan dollars received. The third model included the 
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The results for conventional home loans, as predicted by 2009 local bank 
locations, are displayed in Appendix Table 5. In the first model of the two cities 
together, the spatial lag of conventional home loans and the dichotomy for local banks 
was significant (p < .05). There was a 56 percent increase (e 45 = 1.56) in conventional 
loan dollars received if a census tract had a locally operated bank in its boundaries. The 
second model included concentrated disadvantage and residential instability, which 
reduced the effect of local banks to no longer be significant. In line with the findings of 
the first hypothesis regarding conventional home loans, an increase in concentrated 
disadvantage was associated with a decrease in loan dollars received, while increases in 
instability were associated with increases in loan dollars received. The third model 
included the control for city, which was significant and negated the effect of the spatial 
lag of conventional lending. In this model the variables for concentrated disadvantage 
and residential stability remained significant and in their aforementioned directions.
Looking at Norfolk alone, in the first model having a local bank was statistically 
(p < .05) associated with a doubling (e 71 = 2.04) in conventional loan dollars received. 
However, in the second model, when the social disorganization variables were included, 
this effect was no longer significant, and instead the spatial lag of locally operated banks 
was significant ip < .10). The findings indicated that having a locally operated bank in a 
census tract nearby was associated with a 69 percent reduction ( e 1 17 = 0.31) in 
conventional loan dollars received. Further, as discussed above, an increase in 
concentrated disadvantage was associated with a decrease in loan dollars received, while 
increases in instability were associated with increases in loan dollars received. In the
73
analyses for Virginia Beach the variables for local banks were not significant; only the 
control for concentrated disadvantage.
The results for refinancing loans as predicted by locally owned banks are 
displayed in Appendix Table 6. Throughout the analyses, none of the locally operated 
banks variables were significant. The social disorganization variables were statistically 
significant, and the results were very close to those of hypothesis 1 for refinancing loans.
Appendix Table 7 displays the results for home improvement loans as predicted 
by locally operated bank locations in 2009. However, these results should be interpreted 
with caution due to the small amount of home improvement loans received in the time 
period under examination. In the first model the spatial lag of local banks was significant 
ip < .01), indicating that if there was a locally operated bank in a census tract nearby 
there was a predicted tripling in the amount of home improvement loan dollars received. 
In the additional models of the two cities together, the social disorganization variables 
were included and the locally operated bank variables were no longer significant. The 
remaining variables aligned with the findings of home improvement loans discussed 
above.
In the Norfolk specific analyses, in the first model the dichotomous variable for 
locally operated banks was significant ip < .10). In this model, having a locally operated 
bank in a census tract was associated with an 83 percent increase (e 61 = 1.83) in home 
improvement loan dollars received. The inclusion of the social disorganization variables 
in the second model reduced the effect. However, the spatial lag of locally operated 
banks became significant ip < .05) with their addition. The presence of a locally operated 
bank in a nearby census tract was associated with a decrease of 94 percent (e'2 75 = 0.06)
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of home improvement loan dollars received. Further, in the second Norfolk model 
concentrated disadvantage was significant; however residential instability was not. In the 
Virginia Beach models, none of the locally operated bank variables were statistically 
significant, and in the second model residential instability was found to be associated 
with a decrease in refinancing loan dollars.
HYPOTHESIS 2
H2: Having a bank nearby will result in lower levels o f  neighborhood crime
The results o f the analyses testing hypothesis 2 are displayed in Tables 5 through 
7. Several different findings come from these analyses. First, this hypothesis was not 
supported, and in fact, having a bank nearby resulted in an increase in two crime types, 
violence and vandalism. Second, for the three different types o f crime, population was 
statistically significant across all models, indicating that increases in population were 
associated with increases in crime. Finally, consistent with previous literature, social 
disorganization variables were found to be important but varied by crime type. For 
violent crimes and acts of vandalism, increases in concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability were associated with increases in these crimes. For property 
crimes, only residential instability was significant in the final model, indicating that 
increases in residential instability were associated with increases in property crime.
Table 5 shows the results o f the negative binomial regression analyses for violent 
crimes in 2012, as predicted by bank locations in 2009. For the analyses of the second 
hypothesis the first model included the spatial lag of the dependent variable, the number 
and spatial lag of banks in 2009, and the control for population. In the first model, for the 
cities together, only population size was statistically significant, which indicated that as
the population increased the number of violent crimes increased as well. In the second 
model the theoretically relevant social disorganization variables were added, both of 
which were statistically significant. With the inclusion of disadvantage and instability, 
the number of banks became significant (p < .05), indicating that each additional bank 
results in a predicted 10 percent (e 10 = 1.10) increase in the number of violent crimes in 
the census tract, which was opposite of the hypothesized direction. This model further 
indicated that a standard deviation increase in disadvantage was associated with a 52 
percent (e 42 = 1.52) increase in violent crimes, and a standard deviation increase in 
instability was predicted to increase the number of violent crimes by 23 percent 
(e 21 = 1.23). The third model included the control variable for city, which was not 
statistically significant, and did not change the significance of any of the other variables 
included in the model.
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Table 5. H2; 2009 Bank Locations and 2012 Violent Crime
Both Cities 
N =  164
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 1.29 (0.26)*** 1.09 (0.27)*** 0.87 (0.34)*
Spatial Lag of 
Violent Crime 2012
0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)
Number of Banks 
2009
0.05 (0.04) 0.10(0.04)* 0.10(0.04)*
Spatial Lag of 
Banks 2009
0.03 (0.08) 0.07 (0.08) 0.08 (0.09)
Population 0.00 (4.47E-005)*** 0.00 (4.49E-005)*** 0.00 (5.22E-005)***
Disadvantage - 0.42 (0.10)*** 0.38 (0.11)***
Instability - 0.21 (0.10)* 0.21 (0.10)*
City - - 0.21 (0.21)
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
The change in the coefficient for number of banks upon the entry of the social 
disorganization variables suggested the possibility of a slight suppression effect 
(Thompson and Levine 1997). Subsequent analyses were conducted to explore this 
finding. First was the creation of an interaction term between the number of banks and 
concentrated disadvantage; however, once included in analyses the interaction term was 
not significant. Second, as suggested by Thompson and Levine, correlations between 
these variables were examined. However, this was not found to be of concern.
Table 6 displays the analyses of property crime in 2012, as predicted by bank 
locations in 2009. In the first model for both cities the population was statistically 
significant, which indicated that as the population increased it was predicted that the
number of property crimes would increase too. Additionally, the spatial lag of bank 
locations was also significant (p < .10), indicating that if a census tract had a bank in a 
nearby census tract there was an expected 16 percent increase ( e 15 = 1.16) in property 
crimes. In the second model, the social disorganization variables were included, and 
contrary to the findings for violent crime, o f these only residential instability was 
statistically significant (p < .05). With a standard deviation increase in instability there 
was a predicted 22 percent increase (e 20 = 1.22) in property crimes the census tract 
reported. Further, the inclusion of the theoretical variables reduced the effect of the 
spatial lag of banks to be non-significant. The third model included the control for city, 
and, as with violent crimes, there was no statistical difference between the cities.
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Table 6. H2; 2009 Bank Locations and 2012 Property Crime
Both Cities 
N =  164
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 3.53 (0.24)*** 3.50 (0.26)*** 3.85 (0.40)***
Spatial Lag of 
Property Crime 
2012
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Number of Banks 
2009
0.04 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Spatial Lag of Local 
Banks 2009
0.15 (0.08)+ 0.11 (0.08) 0.10(0.08)
Population 0.00 (4.44E- 0.00 (4.48E- 0.00 (4.98E-
O O Ui 'w
' * * * 005)*** 005)***
Disadvantage - 0.02 (0.10) 0.06 (0.10)
Instability - 0.20 (0.09)* 0.20 (0.09)*
City - - -0.27 (0.23)
+p <.10. *p <.05. **p <.01. ***p <.001.
The results for the analyses of vandalism crimes in 2012 as predicted by bank 
locations in 2009 are presented in Table 7. In the first model for both cities the 
population was statistically significant, which indicated that as the population increased it 
was predicted that the number of vandalism crimes would too. In the second model, 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were added, which were both 
significant. Their inclusion changed the effect of the number of banks to be statistically 
significant (p < .10), when it was not before. This is evidence of a suppression effect as 
discussed above. In the second model the addition of a bank in a census tract was
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associated with an 8 percent increase (e 08 = 1.08) in the number of acts of vandalism that 
census tract has reported. Further, for acts of vandalism, an increase of one standard 
deviation in concentrated disadvantage (p < .05) resulted in a predicted 27 percent 
increase (e 24 = 1.27) and an increase in instability (p < .10) was associated with a 20 
percent increase ( e 19 = 1.20). The third model included the control for city, which was 
significant (p < .10) and indicated a 41 percent increase (e 34 = 1.41) in reported acts of 
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Analyzing the cities separately, slightly different findings were discovered. In the 
analyses for Norfolk, population was significant in both models. Further, in the second 
model, once concentrated disadvantage was accounted for, the number of banks was 
significant (p < .10), indicating a 11 percent increase (e 10= 1.11) in vandalism crimes 
with the addition of a bank to the census tract. In the Virginia Beach models, population 
was significant, and in the second model concentrated disadvantage was significant 
(p < . 10), indicating a 58 percent increase (e45 = 1.58) in vandalisms with each standard 
deviation increase in disadvantage.
H2a: Neighborhoods that have locally operated banks nearby will experience
lower levels o f  neighborhood crime
As shown in Table 8 and Appendix Tables 8 and 9, the analyses for the 
hypothesis predicting that locally owned banks would lower levels of crime indicated that 
for violent crimes and crimes of vandalism having a locally operated bank was associated 
with increases in crime. However, locally operated banks were not statistically 
associated with property crimes. Consistent with the findings in hypothesis la, these 
findings suggested that it did not matter whether the bank was locally owned.
The findings of the negative binomial regression of the relationship between 
violent crimes in 2012 and locally operated banks are in Table 8. Following the same 
procedures as above, the first model for the two cities together indicate that only the 
population was significant. In the second model, the inclusion of concentrated 
disadvantage and instability were both significant in addition to the population, and the 
dichotomous variable for local banks was now statistically significant {p < .05). Results 
from the second model indicated that if a census tract had a locally operated bank the
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number of violent crimes increased by a predicted 70 percent (e53 = 1.70), which was the 
opposite of what was predicted. The inclusion of the social disorganization variables 
changed the effect of the number of banks statistically significant when it was not before, 
which was evidence of a suppression effect. For each standard deviation increase in 
disadvantage there was a predicted 47 percent (e39 = 1.47) increase in violent crimes, and 
for each increase in instability there was a 28 percent (e25 -  1.28) increase. The third 
model for the two cities together included the control for city, which was not significant.
Table 8. H2a; 2009 Local Banks and 2012 Violent Crime
Both Cities
N = 164
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 1.31 (0.25)*** 1.16(0.26)*** 0.96 (0.34)***
Spatial Lag of 
Violent Crime 2013
0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)
Dichotomy of Local 
Banks 2009
0.24 (0.21) 0.53 (0.22)* 0.50 (0.22)*
Spatial Lag of Local 
Banks 2009
0.04 (0.22) 0.01 (0.24) 0.05 (0.25)
Population 0.00 (4.54E- 0.00 (4.51 E- 0.00 (5.31E-
005)*** 005)*** 005)***
Disadvantage - 0.39(0.11)*** 0.36 (0.11)***
Instability - 0.25 (0.10)* 0.25 (0.10)*
City - - 0.18(0.21)
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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The results from the negative binomial regression analyses for 2012 property 
crimes as predicted by the presence of local banks in 2009 are presented in Appendix 
Table 8. In the first model, as in several of the other analyses, only the control for 
population was statistically significant. When the social disorganization variables were 
included, only residential instability was significant, as found in the second hypothesis of 
property crime and banks. The third model included the control for city, which was not 
statistically significant.
The results from the negative binomial regression analyses for 2012 vandalism 
crimes as predicted by the presence of local banks in 2009 are presented in Appendix 
Table 9. In the first model only the control for population was statistically significant. In 
the second model the findings indicated that having a locally operated bank in a census 
tract was associated with a 44 percent increase (e36 = 1.44) in vandalism crimes. Further, 
this model suggested that a standard deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage or in 
residential instability were both associated with a 23 percent increase (e 21 =1.23) in 
vandalisms. In the third model the control for city was included, which was not 
statistically significant.
HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4
H3: Neighborhoods with greater levels o f investment will benefit from lower 
levels o f  neighborhood crime
H4: Any effect o f  banks on crime in a neighborhood will be mediated through 
residential loans
Hypothesis 3 and 4 are presented together in Tables 9 and 10, and Appendix 
Tables 10 through 25, and are organized by loan type for each o f the three crime
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dependent variables. The presentation of hypotheses 3 and 4 together is due to the 
similar and building nature of these two hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 examined the impact 
of different loan types on violent, property, and vandalism crime. Hypothesis 4 built on 
hypothesis 3 by including the variables for bank locations to examine the full theoretical 
model, discussed at the end of chapter 3, for each of the types of lending and crime.
Similar to the steps followed above, for the analysis of the third hypothesis the 
first model included the spatial lag of the dependent variable, loan amount, and spatial lag 
of loans in 2009, and the control for population. The second model included the social 
disorganization variables of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability, and the 
third model included the control for city. The analysis for the fourth hypothesis followed 
the same procedure, except that the number of banks and spatial lag of banks in 2009 
were included in all three models. As above, when the control for city was statistically 
significant, further analyses of the two cities separately are presented.
Overall, there was little support for the third and fourth hypotheses. In the first 
model, loan dollars and the spatial lag were often significant; however, when the social 
disorganization variables were included in the model they were no longer significant.
The exceptions to this were total loan dollars and refinancing loan dollars, both of which 
were found to have a decreasing effect on violent crimes. However, refinancing loan 
dollars made up must of the total loan dollars, making it possible that refinancing loans 
were what was driving the significant findings for total loans.
TOTAL LOANS
The findings for hypothesis 3 for total loan dollars and violent crime supported 
the hypothesis. The findings for hypothesis 4 indicated that total loan dollars and banks
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were both significantly related to violent crime; however, the hypothesis was not 
supported. The findings of hypotheses 3 and 4 for property crimes and acts of vandalism 
were not supported for total loan dollars. For hypothesis 3, focusing on property and 
vandalism crime, total loan dollars were not significant in the final models where social 
disorganization variables were controlled. As was shown in hypothesis 2, bank locations 
were not significantly related to reports of property crime. In the analyses for hypothesis 
4, for acts of vandalism, total loan dollars did not mediate the effect of banks on 
neighborhood levels of crime.
The results from the analyses for violent crime and total loan dollars are in Table 
9. In the first model for hypothesis 3, the variables for total loan dollars and population 
were statistically significant. The negative coefficient for total loan dollars indicated a 
decrease in violent crime with the addition of loan dollars; however, the metric used was 
too small to determine the size of this effect. The second model included the social 
disorganization variables, both concentrated disadvantage (p < .05) and instability 
(p < . 10) were significant. The addition of these variables reduced the statistical 
significance of total loan dollars, but it was still significant at the (p < .10) level. The 
third model included the control for city, which was not significant.
The second half of Table 9 presents the findings for hypothesis 4. In the first 
model, again total loan dollars and population were the only significant variables. These 
findings, as above, indicate that increases in total loan dollars were associated with 
decreases in violent crime, and that increases in population were associated with 
increases in violent crime. The addition of the social disorganization variables reduced 
the effect of total loan dollars to no longer be statistically significant, even though only
concentrated disadvantage was significant. However, their addition also changed the 
significance for the number of banks, which was non-significant in the first model, but 
was significant at the (p < .05) level in the second model. This finding suggested a slight 
suppression effect and indicated that with the addition of each bank in a census tract there 
was an associated 10 percent increase (e 10 = 1.10) in violent crimes. Again the third 
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The findings for property crime and total loan dollars are presented in Appendix 
Table 10. In the first model of hypothesis 3 only total loan dollars and population were 
significant. Again, the negative coefficient for total loan dollars suggested a decrease in 
property crime with the addition of loan dollars to a census tract; however the metric used 
was too small to determine the size of this effect. The second model included 
disadvantage and instability. Their addition reduced the effect of total loan dollars to no 
longer be significant, and as seen in previous analyses for property crime, only residential 
instability was significant. This indicated that standard deviation increases in residential 
instability in a census tract was associated with 23 percent increases (e 20 = 1.23) in 
property crimes. The third model includes the control for city.
Model 1 for hypothesis 4 showed that only the spatial lag of bank location and 
population was significant. The findings for spatial lag of banks indicated that having a 
bank in a census tract nearby was associated with an increase of 14 percent (e 13 = 1.14) in 
property crimes. The inclusion of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability 
reduced the effect to non-significance. As observed with the findings of hypothesis 3 for 
property crimes, only residential instability was significant (p < . 10), and the inclusion of 
the control for city in model 3 is not significant.
Appendix Table 11 displays the results for vandalisms and total loan dollars for 
hypotheses 3 and 4. As discussed above, in the first model, only total loan dollars and 
population were statistically significant, and the negative coefficient for total loan dollars 
suggested that a decrease in acts of vandalism with the addition of loan dollars to a 
census tract; however, the metric used was too small to determine the size of this effect. 
The inclusion of the social disorganization model reduced this effect, and only residential
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instability was significant (p < .05). The finding for residential instability indicated an 
increase of 22 percent (e 20 = 1.22) with a standard deviation increase. The inclusion of 
city in the third model was not significant.
In the first model of hypothesis 4 and vandalism crime, only population size was 
significant. In the second model, concentrated disadvantage is significant (p < .10), as is 
the variable for the number of banks after its inclusion, which suggested a slight 
suppression effect. This indicated that the addition of a bank in a census tract was 
associated with an 8 percent increase (e 08 = 1.08) in acts of vandalisms. In the third 
model with the inclusion of the control for city, which was not significant.
FHA/VA LOANS
The findings of hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported for FHA/VA loans. For 
hypothesis 3, FHA/VA loans were not significantly related to the crime variables in the 
final models when social disorganization variables were controlled. In the analyses for 
hypothesis 4, FHA/VA loans did not mediate the effect of banks on neighborhood levels 
of crime for any of the three crime types examined.
The results of the analysis for hypothesis 3, which examined violent crimes and 
FHA/VA loans, are presented in Appendix Table 12. In the first model for the two cities 
combined, only the control for population was significant; indicating that increases in 
population of a census tract were associated with higher reports of violent crime. Neither 
of the variables for FHA/VA loans were significant. Meaning that the amount of 
FHA/VA loans did not affect violent crime when looking at the two cities together. In 
the second model, the controls for population, concentrated disadvantage, and residential 
instability were significant. These findings indicated that census tracts that had a
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standard deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage had a 40 percent increase 
(e34 = 1.40) in violent crime, and a 30 percent increase (e 26 = 1.30) in violent crime for a 
standard deviation increase in residential instability. The third model included the 
control for city, which was statistically significant.
The second half of Appendix Table 12 shows analysis for the cities separately. In 
Norfolk model 1, total FHA/VA loan dollars was significant (p < .05); however, the 
magnitude of this association cannot be determined because the metric used was too 
small to determine the size of this effect. As in all of the other analyses, population was 
also statistically significant. In the second model, concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability were added neither of which are significant; however, their addition 
reduced the effect of FHA/VA loans to be no longer be significant. In contrast, the first 
model for Virginia Beach had the spatial lag of FHA/VA loans and population was 
significant. Similar to the Norfolk analysis, the effect of the spatial lag of FHA/VA was 
too small to determine the size of the effect. In the second model, the spatial lag of 
FHA/VA lending was no longer significant. In this model only population and 
concentrated disadvantage were significant. A one-standard deviation increase in 
concentrated disadvantage in a census tract in Virginia Beach was associated with twice 
as many (e 75 = 2.13) violent crimes. The difference in findings between the two cities 
was possibly due to an issue of statistical power.
The analyses for hypothesis 4 that examines violent crimes and FHA/VA loan 
dollars are presented in Appendix Table 13. In the first model the only variable that was 
statistically significant was the control for the population. In the second model the 
theoretical variables for concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were
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included, both of which were statistically significant. The addition of these variables 
changed the variable for the number of banks to become significant as well, denoting that 
the increase of one bank in a census tract was associated with an 11 percent increase 
(e 10 = 1.11) in violent crimes. The third model included the control for city, which was 
not significant.
The findings of the analyses for property crimes and FHA/VA loans for 
hypotheses 3 and 4 are presented in Appendix Table 14. In the first model for hypothesis 
3, the variables for the spatial lag of FHA/VA lending and population were significant.
As seen previously, the effect of the spatial lag of FHA/VA lending was too small for the 
magnitude of this association to be determined. The second model included disadvantage 
and instability. Of these, only instability was significant, indicating a 28 percent increase 
(e 25 = 1.28) in property crimes with a standard deviation increase in instability, which 
was consistent with previous findings. Their inclusion reduced the effect of the spatial 
lag of FHA/VA loans to no longer be significant. The third model included the control 
for city, which was not significant.
The analyses for the fourth hypothesis followed a similar pattern. In the first 
model the spatial lag for banks and population were significant. Census tracts that had a 
bank in a census tract near them had an estimated 15 percent increase (e 14 = 1.15) in 
property crimes. However, in the second and third models, when concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability were included this effect was no longer 
significant. Only population and residential instability were significant in the second and 
third models.
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The results of the analysis for hypothesis 3, which examined acts of vandalism 
and FHA/VA loans, are presented in Appendix Table 15. In the analyses for the two 
cities together, and in the separate analyses, none of the lending variables were 
significant. The second and third models for the cities together found that residential 
instability was significantly related to vandalism. In the second model, concentrated 
disadvantage was significant, but when city was controlled in the third model the effect 
of this variable was no longer significant, but city was. In the analyses for the two cities 
separately only the control for population was significant. Again these differences were 
likely due to issues of statistical power.
The findings for hypothesis 4 for vandalism crime, FHA/VA loans, and bank 
locations are presented in Appendix Table 16. In the first model for the two cities 
together only the control for population was significant. The second model included 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability, both of which were significant 
(p'< .05). The inclusion of these variables changed the significance of the variable for 
number of banks (p < .10), which was evidence of a suppression effect. This finding 
indicated that the addition of a bank in a census tract was associated with an 8 percent 
increase (e 08 = 1.08) in vandalisms. The third model included the control for city, which 
was significant (p < .10), and reduced the significance of concentrated disadvantage to 
the {p < .10) level.
In the analysis of Norfolk, only population was statistically significant in both 
models. For the Virginia Beach, in the first model only population was significant. In 
the second model concentrated disadvantage was also significant (p < .10), indicating that 
a standard deviation increase in concentrated disadvantage in a census tract was
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associated with a 57 percent increase (e45 = 1.57) in vandalism crimes. It is interesting 
that the number of banks was significant when the two cities were analyzed together, but 
not when the cities were examined separately. These differences were due to issues of 
statistical power when the two cities were split apart.
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
The findings of hypotheses 3 and 4 are not supported for conventional home loan 
dollars. For hypothesis 3, conventional loan dollars were not significant in the final 
models when social disorganization variables were controlled. In the analyses for 
hypothesis 4, conventional loan dollars did not mediate the effect of banks on 
neighborhood levels of crime.
The findings of the analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4, examining violent crimes and 
conventional loan dollars, are presented in Appendix Table 17. In the first model, 
conventional loan dollars, the spatial lag of conventional loan dollars, and population 
were statistically significant. However, the effect of conventional loans and the spatial 
lag of these variables were too small to determine the size of the effect. When the social 
disorganization variables were included the effect of conventional loan dollars was 
reduced to no longer being significant; the spatial lag of conventional lending however 
was still significant. As observed in previous analyses, increases in concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability were associated with increases in violent crime. 
The third model included the control for city, which was not statistically significant. 
However, the inclusion of this variable reduced the effect of the spatial lag of 
conventional loans to no longer be significant.
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The second half of Appendix Table 17 examines hypothesis 4. In the first model, 
the variables for conventional loan dollars, the spatial lag of conventional loans, and 
population were significant. In contrast to the findings of hypothesis 3, when the controls 
for concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were included, the variables 
related to conventional loans were no longer significant. In the second model, the 
variables for number of banks, population, concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability were significant. The findings for banks revealed an increase of 10 percent 
(e 09 = 1.10) with the addition of a bank in a census tract, which was similar to previous 
findings. As discussed above, banks were only significant when concentrated 
disadvantage was controlled for in the model, which suggested a suppression effect.
When the control for city was included in the third model it was not significant, and there 
was no change in significant variables.
The results of the analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4 on property crimes and 
conventional loans are presented in Appendix Table 18. For hypothesis 3, none of the 
lending variables were significant through the three models. As observed in the prior 
property crime analyses, only residential instability and population were statistically 
significant for property crimes. The analyses for hypothesis 4 produced similar results to 
those of hypothesis 3. In the first model, the spatial lag of banks was significant, 
indicating a 16 percent increase ( e 15 = 1.16) in property crimes in neighborhoods that had 
banks in nearby tracts. It was not significant in subsequent models when concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability were included. In the second and third models, 
only the variables for population and residential instability were found to be statistically 
significant.
Appendix Table 19 displays the results for the analyses of hypotheses 3 and 4, 
examining the relationship between acts of vandalism and conventional loan dollars. In 
the first model for hypothesis 3, both the variables for conventional loan dollars and the 
spatial lag of conventional loan dollars were significant (p < .05), in addition to the 
control for population. The negative coefficient for conventional loan dollars suggested a 
decrease in acts of vandalism with the addition of loan dollars to a census tract; however, 
the metric used was too small to determine the size of this effect. As observed above, the 
effect of the spatial lag of conventional lending was too small to determine the magnitude 
of the effect. When the variables to control for social disorganization were included, the 
effect of the lending variables was reduced considerably, conventional loan dollars were 
no longer significant, and the spatial lag of conventional lending was now significant at 
the {p < .10) level. O f the social disorganization variables, only residential instability 
was significant. In the third model, the control for city was added to the model, which 
was not found to be statistically significant. This addition, however, reduced the effect of 
the spatial lag of conventional loan dollars to no longer be significant, and in the third 
model only population and residential instability were significant.
Similarly, in the first model for hypothesis 4, both of the lending variables were 
significant ip < .05), as was the control for population. Again, the effects of these 
variables were too small to determine the size of the relationship. In the second and third 
models though, the effect of the lending variables were no longer significant when 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were controlled for. In the second 
and third models, only residential instability and population were found to be 
significantly related to acts of vandalism.
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REFINANCING LOANS
The findings for refinancing loans and violent crime support the third hypothesis. 
The findings for hypothesis 4 indicated that refinancing home loan dollars and banks 
were both significantly related to violent crime. However, the hypothesis was not 
supported that the effect of banks will be mediated by lending. The findings of 
hypotheses 3 and 4 for property crimes and acts of vandalism were not supported for 
refinancing loans. For hypothesis 3, focusing on property and vandalism crime, 
refinancing loan dollars were not statistically significant in the final models where social 
disorganization variables were controlled. In the analyses for hypothesis 4 for property 
crimes, neither banks nor refinancing loans were significant. For acts of vandalism, 
banks were significant but refinancing loan dollars were not and did not mediate the 
effect of banks.
Table 10 displays the results for the analyses of hypotheses 3 and 4 that were 
focused on violent crime and refinancing loans. In the first model of hypothesis 3, the 
variables for refinancing loan dollars and population were both significant at the 
(p  < .001) level. The negative coefficient for refinancing loan dollars suggested a 
decrease in violent crimes with the addition of refinancing loan dollars to a census tract; 
however, the metric used was too small to determine the size of this effect. When 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were included in the second model, 
the significance of this effect was reduced but was still significant at the (p < .10) level. 
Additionally, in this model population, concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability were significant. The third model included the control for city, which was not 
significant. The variable for refinancing loan dollars was still significant in this model,
which was one of the two times lending variables that remained significant after 
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In the analyses for the fourth hypothesis, the variable for refinancing loan dollars 
remained statistically significant. In the first model, population was significant and the 
coefficient for refinancing loans was negative and significant. In the second model, 
concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were included. In this model, 
refinancing loans, the number of banks, population, and concentrated disadvantage were 
significant. The negative and significant coefficient for refinancing loans indicated a 
decrease in violent crimes; however, the positive and significant coefficient for banks 
indicated an increase in violent crime. In this model the addition of a bank in a census 
tract was associated with an increase of 11 percent ( e 10 = 1.11) in violent crimes. This 
finding is the same as the findings of hypothesis 2 that examined bank locations and 
violent crime, indicating that the effect of banks on neighborhood violent crime was not 
mediated by refinancing loan dollars. The third model included the control for city, 
which was not significant. The variable for refinancing loan dollars was still significant 
in this model, which was the only time lending variables remained significant after 
controlling for concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and bank locations.
The results of the analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4 on property crimes and 
refinancing loans are presented in Appendix Table 20. For hypothesis 3, only the 
variable of refinancing loan dollars was significant in the first model. Again, the negative 
coefficient for refinancing loan dollars indicated a decrease in property crimes with the 
addition of loan dollars to a census tract; however, the metric used was too small to 
determine the size of this effect. As observed in the above analyses, only residential 
instability and population were found to be statistically significant to property crimes.
The analyses for hypothesis 4 produced similar results. In the first model, the spatial lag
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of banks as significant, indicating a 14 percent increase (e 13= 1.14) in property crimes in 
census tracts that had banks in nearby tracts. The spatial lag of banks was not significant 
in subsequent models when concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were 
included. In the second and third models, only the variables for population and 
residential instability were found to be statistically significant.
Appendix Table 21 displays the results for acts of vandalism and refinancing loan 
dollars for hypotheses 3 and 4. In the first model the variables for refinancing loan 
dollars and population were statistically significant. The negative coefficient for 
refinancing loan dollars suggested a decrease in acts of vandalism with the addition of 
refinancing loan dollars to a census tract; however, its metric was too small to determine 
the size of this effect. With the inclusion of the social disorganization models the effect 
of refinancing loan dollars that the census tract received was no longer statistically 
significant. As seen in the previous analyses for vandalism, residential instability and 
population were the only significant variables in the second and third models of the third 
hypothesis.
Similarly, in the first model for hypothesis 4, both of the variables for refinancing 
loan dollars was significant, as was the control for population. Again, the effects of these 
variables were too small to determine the size of the effect; however, a negative direction 
of the relationship was suggested by the negative coefficient. The effect of refinancing 
loan dollars was no longer significant when concentrated disadvantage and residential 
instability were controlled. In the second model the number of banks was significant 
{p < .10), indicating an 8 percent increase (e 08= 1.08) in vandalisms with the addition of 
a bank to a census tract. In contrast to the findings of hypothesis 3, in the second model
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for hypothesis 4, concentrated disadvantage was significant (p < .10), but residential 
instability was not. In the third model city was controlled for, which was not significant 
but reduced the effect of banks and concentrated disadvantage to no longer being 
significant. In the third model for hypothesis 4, only the control for population was 
statistically significant.
HOME IMPROVEMENT LOANS
The findings of hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported for home improvement 
loans. For hypothesis 3, home improvement loan dollars were not significant in the final 
models, where social disorganization variables were controlled. In the analyses for 
hypothesis 4, home improvement loan dollars did not mediate the effect of banks on 
neighborhood levels of crime.
The results for the analyses of hypotheses 3 and 4 focused on violent crime and 
home improvement loans are presented in Appendix Table 22. In the first model, the 
variables for home improvement loan dollars and population were significant. In the 
second and third models, this effect was no longer significant, and only the controls for 
concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, and population were significant. 
Similarly, the analyses for hypothesis 4 indicated that home improvement loan dollars 
were significant in the first model; however, when concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability were accounted for the effect was no longer significant. The 
inclusion of the social disorganization variables in the second and third models changed 
the variable for the number of banks to become significant, which was evidence of a 
suppression effect as discussed above. The addition of a bank in a census tract was 
associated with an 11 percent increase ( e 10 = 1.11) in violent crimes.
The results of the analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4 on property crimes and home 
improvement loans are presented in Appendix Table 23. For hypothesis 3, none of the 
lending variables were significant through the three models. As observed in above 
analyses only residential instability and population were found to be statistically 
significant to property crimes. The analyses for hypothesis 4 produced similar results. In 
the first model, the spatial lag of banks was significant, indicating an 18 percent increase 
(e 16 = 1.18) in property crimes in census tracts that had banks in nearby tracts. The 
spatial lag o f banks was not significant in subsequent models when concentrated 
disadvantage and residential instability were included. In the second and third models, 
only the variables for population and residential instability were found to be statistically 
significant.
Appendix Table 24 displays the results for the analyses of hypothesis 3, 
examining the relationship between acts of vandalism and home improvement loans. As 
observed in above analyses of acts of vandalism, in the first model the lending variables 
for home improvement loan dollars and the control for population were significant. The 
effects of these variables were too small to determine the size o f the effect; however, a 
negative relationship was suggested by the negative coefficient. With the inclusion of the 
social disorganization variables, the effect of refinancing loan dollars that a census tract 
received was no longer statistically significant. As seen in the previous analyses for 
vandalism, residential instability and population were the only significant variables in the 
second model. In the third model though, when the control for city was included in the 
analyses it was significant. In the analyses of the two cities separately only the control 
for population was significant in the models, perhaps due to statistical power.
Appendix Table 25 displays the results for the analyses of hypothesis 4, 
examining the relationship between acts of vandalism, home improvement loans, and 
bank locations. As observed above, in the first model for the two cities together, the 
lending variables for home improvement loan dollars and the control for population were 
significant. The inclusion of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability, both 
of which were significant, diminished this effect to no longer be significant; however, 
their inclusion did change the effect of the number of banks to become significant 
ip< .10), suggestive of a slight suppression effect. When the control for city was 
included in the third model, the effect of disadvantage was reduced to being non­
significant. In the third model the variables for the number of banks, residential 
instability, population, and city were significant. In the Norfolk specific models, the 
variables for home improvement loans and population were significant in the first model. 
However, in the second model only the control for population was significantly related to 
acts of vandalism. In the Virginia Beach models, population was the only significant 
variable in the first model, and in the second model concentrated disadvantage was 
significant at the ip < . 10) level.
STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL TO TEST FOR RECIPROCAL CAUSATION
The final stage of analysis tested for the possibility of reciprocal causation, which 
had been suggested as a possibility by previous research (Velez 2009; Velez and 
Richardson 2012). Though some research in Seattle, Velez et al. (2012) found that there 
was no statistically significant relationship between prior levels of neighborhood crime 
and the amount of mortgage investment received, it is possible that such a relationship 
does exist. However, the tests for reciprocal causation were not found to produce
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significant results. Similar to the findings of Velez et al. (2012), there was no evidence 
that the direction of the crime and lending relationship influenced where residential 
lending was happening. This indicated that the hypothesized direction of the relationship 
between lending and crime that guided this research was correct.
Seven structural equation models were conducted to examine this possibility, 
none of which produced consistent results. In the analyses between the rates of each 
crime type and banks there were no significant findings between the different variables. 
There were high stability coefficients between the variables over time, suggesting that 
rates of crime and number of banks were relatively stable over the time period measured.
The structural equation models for loans and crime rates resulted in more 
substantial findings. As seen with the negative binomial analyses, property crimes were 
not significantly related to loan dollars received. However, there were statistically 
significant findings for the analyses of violent crime and acts of vandalism as related to 
total loan dollars. Appendix Figure 1 displays the SEM analyses for violent crime rates. 
Total loan dollars in 2007 had a significant decreasing effect on the violent crime rate in 
2010. This effect however was not found for the 2009 total loan dollars and 2012 violent 
crime rate.
Similarly, Appendix Figure 2 displays the SEM analyses for acts of vandalism. 
The total loan dollars in 2007 had a decreasing effect on the rate of vandalisms in 2010. 
Yet, this effect was not found in the subsequent years of analyses. Further, in this model 
the effect of the vandalism rate in 2008 had a significant and negative effect on total loan 
dollars in 2009. This effect was not found for the subsequent years included in the 
analyses. This was the only time that there was any evidence of reciprocal causation, that
105
crimes were influencing loans and not the other way around. The findings from the 
structural equation models did not empirically support reciprocal causation, and 
suggested that the hypothesis that loans influenced crimes was more likely.
EXTENDED ANALYSES
There were several findings in the course of the planned analyses that warranted 
further investigation. For example, in testing the first hypothesis it was found several 
times in the Norfolk analyses that when the social disorganization variables were added 
in the second model the spatial lag of banks in 2009 became significant. A similar 
finding was discovered in hypothesis la, regarding the spatial lag of local banks and the 
social disorganization variables. The relationships between these variables were 
examined and the significant findings o f refinancing loans were further analyzed.
In the analyses for the first hypothesis the spatial lag for banks was significant and 
negative for four of the five models in the Norfolk analyses, but only when concentrated 
disadvantage was controlled. The change in the coefficient for the spatial lag of banks 
when concentrated disadvantage was controlled for suggested the possibility of a 
suppression effect (Thompson and Levine 1997). One possible explanation for this may 
be an interaction effect. The creation of an interaction term between the spatial lag of 
banks and concentrated disadvantage was statistically significant in all four cases. 
Additional analyses of the four loan types were conducted and the results are presented in 
Table 11.
In the analysis of total loan dollars as predicted by bank locations, the spatial lag 
of banks, and the interaction term between the spatial lag of banks and disadvantage are 
both significant (p < .05). When concentrated disadvantage was at its mean of zero, the
effect of having a bank in a neighborhood nearby was a decrease of 21 percent 
(e"24 = 0.79) in total loan dollars received. The interaction term showed that the effect of 
the spatial lag of banks varied with levels o f concentrated disadvantage. In 
neighborhoods where there were high levels of concentrated disadvantage, having a bank 
nearby was associated with decreases in the total loan dollars received. In the analysis of 
conventional home loan dollars, the spatial lag of banks, concentrated disadvantage, 
residential instability, and the interaction term were significant (p < .001). When 
concentrated disadvantage was at its mean, the effect of having a bank in a neighborhood 
nearby was a decrease of 50 percent (e"70 = 0.50) in conventional home loan dollars 
received. The effect of concentrated disadvantage when the spatial lag of banks was zero 
was a 42 percent decrease (e"57 = 0.58) in conventional loans.
As was seen in the original analyses, increases in residential instability were 
associated with increases in the amount of conventional loans received, specifically a 
predicted 59 percent increase, which was lower than the original estimate. The 
interaction term was significant and interpreted the same as above, indicating that having 
a bank in a census tract nearby negatively impacted the amount of conventional loans 
received in neighborhoods that were disadvantaged. For refinancing loans the variables 
for the spatial lag of banks, concentrated disadvantage, and the interaction term were 
significant. When concentrated disadvantage was at its mean, the effect of having a bank 
in a neighborhood nearby was a decrease of 20 percent (e"22 = 0.80) in refinancing loan 
dollars received. The effect of concentrated disadvantage when the spatial lag of banks 
was zero was a 22 percent decrease (e"25 = 0.78) in refinancing loans received. Again,
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the interaction indicated that having a bank in a census tract nearby negatively impacted 
the amount of refinancing loans received in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Finally, for home improvement loans the variables for the spatial lag of banks, 
concentrated disadvantage, and the interaction term were significant. When concentrated 
disadvantage was at its mean, the effect of having a bank in a neighborhood nearby was a 
decrease of 41 percent (e‘53 = 0.59) in home improvement loan dollars received. The 
effect of concentrated disadvantage when the spatial lag of banks was zero is a 30 percent 
decrease (e '36 = 0.70) in home improvement loans received. Again, the interaction 
indicated that having a bank in a census tract nearby negatively impacted the amount of 
home improvement loans received in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
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Intercept 9.02 (0.38)*** 6.96 (0.28)*** 8.72(0.32)*** 4.32 (0.34)***











-0.00 (0.06) -0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.14(0.11)
Spatial Lag of 
Banks 2009
-0.24 (0.12)* -0.67 (0.14)*** -0.22 (0.12)+ -0.53 (0.15)**
Disadvantage -0.24 (0.15) -0.54 (0.15)*** -0.25 (0.15)+ -0.36(0.18)*
Instability -0.14(0.15) 0.46 (0.14)*** -0.22 (0.15) -0.15(0.20)
Interaction
Term
-0.15 (0.07)* -0.44 (0.12)*** -0.13 (0.07)* -0.49 (0.13)***
+p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
In the analyses for hypothesis la  the spatial lag of local banks was significant and 
negative for conventional and home improvement loans in the Norfolk analyses, but only 
when concentrated disadvantage was controlled for. The change in the coefficient for the 
spatial lag o f local banks when concentrated disadvantage was controlled for suggested 
the possibility of a suppression effect (Thompson and Levine 1997). The creation of an 
interaction term between the spatial lag of banks and concentrated disadvantage was not 
statistically significant for conventional home loans. The interaction effect was
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significant for the analysis of home improvement loans; however, due to the small 
number of cases the estimates were not reliable.
Only two types of lending were associated with decreases in violent crime, total 
loans, and refinancing loan dollars. Refinancing loans comprised most of the total loan 
dollars and thus might well be driving the findings for total loan. In the subsequent 
analyses the four types of lending were categorized into “investment loans” and 
“reinvestment loans.” The category of investment loans consisted o f FHA/VA loans and 
conventional home loans, as they were used to purchase new homes. Reinvestment loans 
however were used to improve a current home or home mortgage; therefore this category 
consisted of refinancing and home improvement loans. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 12.
In the first model for hypothesis 3 both forms of lending were significant, and 
associated with a decrease in violent crime. The negative coefficient for the lending 
variables suggested a decrease in violent crimes with the addition of both kinds of loan 
dollars to a census tract; however, the metric used was too small to determine the size of 
this effect. In the second model the social disorganization variables were included, which 
reduced the effect of investment loans to no longer be significant. Reinvestment loans 
were still significant as was population, concentrated disadvantage, and residential 
instability. As seen in the other analyses, increases in concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability were associated with increases in violent crime. Model 3 included 
the control for city that was not significant. When both types of loans were included in 
an analysis of violent crime in 2012, and the social disorganization variables were also
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included, the reinvestment loans were found to be significant while the investment loans 
were not.
In the first model of the analysis for hypothesis 4 both forms of lending were 
significant and indicated a decrease in neighborhood violent crime. The inclusion of the 
social disorganization variables changed the variable for the number of banks to become 
significant, which was evidence of a suppression effect, as discussed before. The 
inclusion of the variables also changed the effect of investment dollars to no longer be 
significant. Reinvestment loans were still significant in this model; however, they did not 
reduce the effect of banks on violent crime. In the third model the control for city was 
included, which was not significant but changed the significance level of reinvestment 
loans to no longer be significant. This finding was not believed to be problematic though 
because reinvestment loans in model 2 were significant at the p  < . 10 level, and the 
change in the significance level for model 3 was very small.
The extended analyses of investment and reinvestment loans on crime were also 
conducted for property and vandalism crimes. However, there were no significant 
findings, as would be predicted by the results of the previous analyses of these two types 
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One of the most recent developments in social disorganization theory has been the 
examination of the role of institutions and their effects on neighborhoods. This research 
tested some key ideas in social disorganization theory and contributed to the literature by 
including banks as a social institution, and examining their role in residential lending. No 
other research has studied the influence of institutions outside of neighborhoods and their 
effects on neighborhood crime through residential lending.
The second contribution of this research to this growing body of knowledge is 
that, rather than using only an aggregated measure of lending, the current research used 
both aggregated and disaggregated measures of mortgage, refinancing, and home 
improvement lending. This is an important contribution because it was previously 
unknown if different kinds of residential lending had different effects on neighborhood 
crime.
The third contribution is the inclusion of property crimes and acts of vandalism to 
the analyses. Prior research examining residential lending has emphasized homicide and 
violent crimes. The last contribution to the literature is the use of the cities of Norfolk 
and Virginia Beach to test the relationship between banks, lending, and crime in two new 
contexts. Each of these contributions and their findings are summarized below and their 
implications for future research are discussed.
DO BANKS MATTER?
The main question that has driven this research is, do banks matter? And if they 
do, what kind of effect do banks have on neighborhood crime? The findings indicated 
that banks do matter, however in a different way than was hypothesized. It was theorized 
that banks, either having one in the neighborhood or one nearby, would have a positive 
effect on neighborhoods and that this effect would work through residential lending. 
However, the findings indicate a different relationship.
The first research question was, does having a bank in or nearby a neighborhood 
impact levels of residential lending? In the first hypothesis it was predicted that having a 
bank in the neighborhood would increase the amount of loan dollars a neighborhood 
received. Prior research by Ergungor (2010) and Ergungor and Moulton (2011) found 
that the presence of bank branches was associated with increased access to mortgage 
loans.
The findings of this research did not support this prediction and at times showed 
the opposite. When the spatial lag of banks was significant in the analyses it was actually 
associated with a decrease in loan dollars received. This was found in two of the five 
analyses when examining the two cities together for conventional and refinancing loans. 
However, when looking at Norfolk and Virginia Beach separately, the spatial lag of 
banks was only found to be significant in the Norfolk analyses. The spatial lag for banks 
was significant and negative for four of the five analyses: total, conventional, refinancing, 
and home improvement loan dollars in the Norfolk analyses. Importantly, this only 
occurred when concentrated disadvantage was controlled for.
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Further examination indicated that there was an interaction effect between the 
spatial lag of banks and concentrated disadvantage in Norfolk. The interaction term 
indicated that having a bank in a census tract nearby negatively impacted the amount of 
loans received in disadvantaged neighborhoods. This is an important finding because it 
supported the idea that banks played a role in residential lending, as well as the idea that 
there were important differences between cities. However, it is important to remember 
that the amount of loan dollars received was influenced more by the social 
disorganization variables than by the number of banks in a neighborhood or nearby.
To further understand the role of banks, it was asked if locally owned banks had 
different effects on residential lending. In hypothesis 1 a it was predicted that having a 
locally owned bank nearby would have a positive effect on residential loan dollars 
received. The findings, similar to those of hypothesis 1, provided no support for this 
hypothesis. Having a locally owned bank in a neighborhood was not significantly related 
to the amount of residential lending received, at least not when looking at the two cities 
together, or when looking at Virginia Beach alone. For Norfolk, having a locally 
operated bank nearby, but not within the neighborhood, was found to decrease the 
amount of conventional and home improvement loan dollars received, but once again 
only when concentrated disadvantage was controlled for, which was further evidence of 
an interaction effect. Again, the amount of loan dollars received was influenced more by 
the social disorganization variables than by having a locally owned bank within a 
neighborhood or nearby.
To examine the effects of banks on crime in the second hypothesis it was 
predicted that having a bank in a neighborhood or nearby would result in lower incidents
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of crime. The results do not support this hypothesis, and in fact the opposite was found 
for violent crimes and acts of vandalism. Having a bank in a census tract was found to be 
associated with an increase in violent crimes; however, this variable was only significant 
if concentrated disadvantage was included in the model.
Tests for multicollinearity and interaction effects were not significant, which was 
evidence of a slight suppression between the number of banks and concentrated 
disadvantage. The exact nature of the relationship of this suppression effect was unclear 
and awaits future research. Further increases in levels of concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability were also associated with increases in violent crime. Lee et al. 
(2013) have also found the number of banks to be associated with increases in violent 
crime. These findings, however, were in opposition of prior research that found that 
having a bank nearby was associated with decreases in crime (Fairchild and Rai 2011; 
Garmasie and Moskowitz 2004; Slocum et al. 2013).
How banks affect property crimes and acts o f vandalisms has not been examined 
in prior research. The number of banks or having a bank nearby was not associated with 
any significant change in property crimes reported. O f the social disorganization 
variables only residential instability was significantly related to property crime. 
Neighborhoods with higher levels of residential instability reported higher number of 
property crimes. For acts of vandalism, having a bank within a census tract was 
associated with an increase in reported acts, as were concentrated disadvantage and 
residential instability. Further, acts of vandalism were the only crime type for which the 
control for city was significant. However, when the two cities were examined separately, 
no variables were significant, perhaps due to the lack of statistical power. The absence of
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a relationship between property crimes and banks is worthy of consideration. Although 
acts of vandalism can be considered a form of property crime it is possible that they have 
more in common with violent crimes than is usually assumed.
Locally owned banks, which were the focus of hypothesis 2a, were found to have 
similar effects on neighborhood levels of crime. Locally owned banks were found to be 
associated with increases in violent crime, and to have no significant effect on property 
crimes or acts of vandalism when the social disorganization variables are included in the 
analyses. The effects of the social disorganization variables were consistent with the 
findings of hypothesis 2. As the analyses of hypothesis 2 and 2a show, the social 
disorganization variables were more significantly related to all three crime types than the 
proximity of banks are.
DOES LENDING MATTER?
The second line of questions that guided the research was related to the effects of 
residential lending. How do banking investments affect neighborhood crime? And, do 
different forms of residential lending have different effects on neighborhood crime? In 
the third hypothesis it was predicted that the neighborhoods that received residential 
loans would benefit from lower instances of crime. Prior literature has consistently found 
a robust and significant negative relationship between residential lending received by a 
neighborhood and violent crime rates (Peterson and Kivro 2009a, 2009b; Saporu et al.
2011; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Squires and O’Connor 2001 Velez 2009; Velez and 
Richardson 2012; Velez, Lyons and Boursaw 2012).
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The findings of this research supported prior findings, but also expanded upon 
them. For total loan dollars and refinancing loan dollars there was a significant ip < .10) 
negative relationship between loan dollars and violent crimes. This indicated that as total 
or refinancing loan dollars received by a neighborhood increases violent crime decreases. 
However, the metric used was too small to determine the size of the effect. These 
findings indicated that it was refinancing loans that were driving the effect of total loan 
dollars. Since prior research has only used the measure of total loans the distinction 
between investment and reinvestment was lost. None of the types of residential lending 
were found to be significantly related to property crimes or acts of vandalism for the 
cities included in the analyses. As was observed in the prior hypotheses, crime was 
found to be influenced more by social disorganization variables than by the amount of 
residential lending a neighborhood received.
Finally, it was asked if the effect of banks on neighborhood crime worked through 
residential lending. The fourth hypothesis extended the third hypothesis to predict that 
the effect of banks on crime would work through residential lending, which was a test of 
the theoretical model proposed in chapter 3. The findings did not support this prediction 
or the theoretical model. As was found in the analyses for hypothesis 2, the number of 
banks had a positive or increasing effect on violent crimes and acts of vandalism. The 
inclusion of the various measures of residential lending did not mediate the effect of 
banks on these types of crime. Building off of the findings of the third hypothesis, the 
inclusion of the number of banks changed the effect of total loan dollars to no longer be 
significantly related to violent crimes. For refinancing loans however, the inclusion of 
banks did not reduce the negative or decreasing effect of loan dollars. The effect of
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refinancing loans on violent crime was the only significant result of residential lending in 
all of the analyses for the fourth hypothesis. Even with the lending variables included in 
the analyses the effect that banks had on violent crimes and acts of vandalism were 
consistent with the findings of hypothesis 2.
Overall, the basic components of social disorganization theory were better at 
explaining crime in Norfolk and Virginia Beach than residential lending and bank 
locations were. Concentrated disadvantage and residential instability were consistently 
and positively related to violent crimes and acts of vandalism. In these analyses, property 
crimes were not significantly related to many of the variables included except for 
residential instability. Increased rates of residential instability were consistently 
associated with higher reports of property crime.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Despite the contributions to the literature there were several limitations to this 
research. First, despite adding to the literature on banks and their effects on 
neighborhood crime, the bank location data was restricted to depository banks. Credit 
unions and mortgage banks were not included in these analyses. The exclusion of other 
financial institutions could be problematic because over half of the mortgages in the U.S. 
originate from mortgage banks. As discussed, banks have been associated with 
encouraging asset accumulation, which is important to acquiring home loans. It is 
important however, to examine all financial institutions that could assist in this process. 
Future research should expand on the types of financial institutions included.
119
A second limitation was found in the measures of banking behavior used. The 
focus here was on residential lending; however, from history we know that banking 
practices could have many different impacts. Other behaviors of banks should be 
examined, such as their contributions to community events or their other banking 
practices. Examining other banking practices such as their role in the housing market 
crash, subprime mortgage loans, and relationship to payday lending companies could 
allow for deeper understanding of why banks have negative effects on neighborhoods.
A third limitation was the use of HDMA data. Prior research on residential 
lending and crime has utilized HDMA data, and often mentions its shortcomings. One 
shortfall of the data however is that the data did not contain information on where the 
loans were acquired from. There was data available that lists by borrower how many 
loans and how much lending each census tract received. However, for example, there 
was only one listing for Bank of America and there was no way of knowing if the 
applicants went to the location in their neighborhood or not. It was assumed that 
residential lending would be received from nearby bank branches; however, there was no 
way to test this with the data available.
In addition to the concern of not knowing what location an applicant applied for a 
loan, there was the growth of online banking. It is possible that many of the home loans 
applied for were completed at least partly online. The expansion of online mortgage 
lenders and banking could also have an effect on bank branches. It is possible that bank 
branches are becoming less important to accommodating customers banking needs. In 
order to overcome these limitations, primary data would need to be collected possibly by 
surveying homeowners on their banking practices and decisions regarding their mortgage
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and other lending needs. While this data may be difficult to collect due to its sensitive 
nature, it would allow for a better understanding of the relationship between banks and 
residential lending.
The fact that significant findings for refinancing loans could be artifacts of several 
contextual elements was another possible limitation. Refinancing loans comprised a 
majority of the residential loans received by Norfolk and Virginia Beach census tracts. It 
is possible that the utter amount was what drove these findings to be significant compared 
to the home purchasing loans. If this were to be true, it would mean that what kind of 
loan it is does not matter, that different loans do not have different effects; it is just 
important that money is coming into the neighborhood. Related to this was the time 
period under examination in this research. The data used for this research was from a 
period just following historic changes in the housing and mortgage markets. It is possible 
then that the findings were due to the specific time period that was examined. This could 
explain why refinancing loans comprised such a large amount o f total loan dollars 
received. During the period under study many people across the country stood to lose 
money by selling their houses and thus refinanced instead. Their choice to “reinvest in 
the neighborhood” could possibly have nothing to do with the neighborhood, but have 
more to do with the recovering housing market and the potential for economic loss. 
However, residential lending needs to be examined by the type of lending neighborhoods 
are receiving. If findings for other cities are consistent with those found here it is 
possible that the significant findings of community investment could actually be findings 
of community reinvestment. Findings here suggest that if research continues to be done 
examining the lending types only as a combined measure the truth will remain unknown.
Another limitation of this research was that it is focused on only two mid-sized 
east coast cities. Further, using the dichotomous variable of city as an indicator to 
conduct separate analyses was problematic. When this variable was significant it was an 
indication of differences in the intercept between the two cities rather than differences in 
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables. However, there is 
little theoretical reason available to support examining city differences. The findings of 
this research though, such as the interaction and suppression effects, suggested that city 
differences are important. The prior research has focused on large cities such as Chicago, 
Seattle, and cities with populations over 300,000 (Peterson and Kivro 2009a, 2009b; 
Saporu et al. 2011; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Squires and O’Connor 2001 Velez 2009; 
Velez and Richardson 2012; Velez, Lyons and Boursaw 2012). The census tracts in these 
large cities received substantially more residential lending than Norfolk and Virginia 
Beach did, which could be part o f the reason more substantial results have been found. 
However, there are relatively few cities that are similar to Chicago and Seattle, and 
research needs to continue in new cities to see if the findings are still applicable to new 
contexts. Additionally, there is a need for theoretical development about differences 
between cities that are not captured by social disorganization variables.
Finally, typically the measure of residential instability has been measured and 
interpreted the same way for decades. Residential instability is measured as the percent 
of people over the age of five who lived somewhere differently five years ago, and by the 
percent of people who rent their home. Other measures are sometimes included, but 
these are the core components, based on the work of Shaw and McKay. Residential 
instability is usually interpreted to have a negative impact on neighborhood social
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cohesion. Many of the findings discussed in this research follow these general guidelines, 
and indicated that residential stability had adverse effects on residential lending and 
neighborhood crime.
There was one exception however, the findings of hypothesis 1. For conventional 
home loans, increases in residential instability were associated with increases in loan 
dollars received. This makes sense. In order for mortgages to be needed, for homes to be 
bought, there needs to be some level of residential instability. Seeing this and thinking it 
through opens up the thought that it is possible that residential instability as traditionally 
measured is not always an indicator of disorganization. For example, new developments 
where homes are being built would increase the number of new residents but that would 
not necessarily be evidence of disorganization. Conversely, today, in areas with lots of 
students or military, the renting of homes does not necessarily equate to an unstable or 
undesirable neighborhood. The original conceptualization of residential stability is still 
meaningful; however, as the world becomes increasingly mobile this concept maybe in 
need of reconceptualization.
Despite these limitations this research makes several contributions to the growing 
body of knowledge of social institutions and residential lending. To answer the main 
question that drove this research, banks do matter. However, they do not matter in the 
ways predicted, since in the cities examined having them nearby had adverse effects on 
residential lending and neighborhood crime. Further research is needed to understand 
why banks have these effects. Additionally research needs to continue to examine 
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Appendix Figure 1. Structural Equation Model for Violent Crime and Total Loan Dollars
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